Hi, Am Donnerstag, den 31.01.2013, 09:42 +0100 schrieb Ertugrul Söylemez: > And that may even be more harmful, because an insecure system with a > false sense of security is worse than an insecure system alone. > > Let's do it properly.
but don’t overengineer it either. Simply adding to hackage the possibility to store a .asc file next to the tar.gz file that contains the cryptographic signature would be a great start, and allow us to develop a WoT model later on. (I try to resist from wondering whether this could go into hackage1 or only hackage2, and in the latter case, whether that means that we actually have the time to overengineer the system.) In fact, a lot would already be gained by a simple „warn if foo-2.0 is signed with a different key than the version of foo already installed“ on cabal-install and people having a closer look at uploads from different people. Not much infrastructure needed there. Greetings, Joachim -- Joachim "nomeata" Breitner m...@joachim-breitner.de | nome...@debian.org | GPG: 0x4743206C xmpp: nome...@joachim-breitner.de | http://www.joachim-breitner.de/
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