Tomasello argues that the key ontogenetic addition which distinguishes humans from other primates is the ability of individuals to understand conspecifics as beings like themselves who have intentional and mental lives like their own. (The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition, p5)
With this in mind, I took another look at Sanders 1989. Which emotions require an intentional understanding of other agents and which do not? In other words, which emotions could conceivably be experienced by apes and which are uniquely human emotions? Sanders identifies six emotions: anger, gratitude, approval, disapproval, guilt, and shame (p7). I look at each in turn. * Guilt -- You feel guilty if you believe that you have done something that you think is wrong, and you believe that you knew it was wrong at the time you did it. There is no mention of other agents in the definition of guilt. To feel guilt, there is no need to understand other agents as intentional. Hence, ape can likely feel guilt. * Approval -- You approve of someone if you believe that they have done something they should. * Disapproval - You disapprove of someone if you believe that they have done something they shouldn't. As written, these definitions can be understood in a Behaviorist sense. The concern is not _why_ someone has done something they should or shouldn't. The focus in on the behavior only. Hence, apes can likely feel approval and disapproval. As an example for approval, Sanders offers "Barney knew that Jack had donated groceries to a charity." An ape would approve, but a human might ask why Jack made the donation. Has Jack made his fortune by marketing cigarettes and alcohol? A human can understand the larger situation and, perhaps, have a more appropriate reaction. As as example for disapproval, Sanders offers "Jack stole a candy bar from the supermarket. Betty saw him." An ape would disapprove, but a human might ask why Jack stole the candy. What if Jack was the only son of the owner of the shop and Betty knew it? * Gratitude -- You are grateful to someone if you think they did something that you wanted them to do that benefited you, and their action was not conditioned on receiving anything in return. The only difficulty here, for an ape, is the clause about the action not being conditional on something in return. This difficulty is easily overcome. An ape can presumably feel gratitude simply by assuming, without any special justification, that nothing is expected in return. * Anger -- You become angry at someone if you think they did something wrong, you didn't want them to do it, and you think they knew it was wrong. Only one clause poses any difficulty for an ape. To get angry, an ape must believe that the other conspecific knews that what he/she was doing was wrong. Similar to Gratitude, no special justification is needed to support this belief. As an example of anger, Sanders offers "Jack went to the supermarket. He parked his car in a legal parking place. When he came out, it was gone." An ape would be angry, but a human might want to know why someone took his car. What if Jack's friend had stolen Jack's car because it was urgently need to take Jack's mother to the hospital? A human version of anger could be more cautious about weighing the motives of the alleged thief. * Shame -- You feel ashamed if you believe that you have done something that someone else thinks is wrong, you think they know what you've done, and you care what they think. It is necessarily a human goal to want someone else not to disapprove of you. An ape cannot hold such a goal because apes do not understand conspecifics as mental beings. Hence, shame is a human emotion.
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