War With Iran Who Would Benefit From It? By Arash Jalali Freelance Journalist - Tehran Forward By : http://www.shariqkhan.page.tl
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad addresses a news conference in Tehran, April 4, 2007 (Reuters Photo). The "International Community" is increasingly tightening the ropes of sanctions on Iran with the hope of budging Iran's stance on the nuclear issue. Yet, the Islamic Republic's tone seems to be moving more boldly towards embracing the possibility of total isolation, or even military confrontation, rather than attempting to diffuse the tensions and managing the issue within the realm of diplomacy. In fact, not only is Iran not showing any willingness to take any positive steps, with the ceasing of the 15 British sailors and the subsequent war of words, but also it seems that the Iranian leadership is looking forward to further fueling an already volatile situation. The reactions of the Western countries, notably the United States and the United Kingdom, with respect to all these issues, have not been any more promising. While Americans say they should be given credit for seeking cooperation from and sitting at the same table with the Iranians on the issue of security in Iraq, they all the same capture Iranian citizens allegedly members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) who Iran claims to be diplomats in Iraq. This is in addition to the retired Iranian defense ministry official who is claimed by the Iranian government to have been kidnapped by US and Israeli intelligence operatives in Turkey, a claim both the United States and Israel deny (BBC). The question that hovers in the minds of many Iranians is on whether some sort of non-diplomatic (i.e. military) confrontation between the United States and Iran would eventually occur. How unreasonable or far-fetched a confrontation scenario might seem to the average person has little bearing on whether or not it will actually happen. What does matter is how committed the two sides are to a cause, be it diplomacy or military confrontation. This was certainly the case when everyone wondered if the United States would really invade Iraq, and the same logic applies to the current situation with Iran, except that this time, it is not just the dominant Neoconservative doctrine within the US administration that would like to see the standoff end with a military confrontation. Parts of the Iranian establishment, as also witnessed by some political analysts, seem to have some interest in escalating the situation to something more than just a diplomatic row (Ansari). During the 1980s, there was no room for any form of freedom. The state interfered with every aspect of people's private lives. The 1980s Nostalgia Certain elements within the Iranian regime, specifically the hardliner president as well as part of the IRGC that supports him, have strong reasons to not only invite but also to actively pursue a path that leads to some sort of political cul-de-sac, which could in turn call for a preferably limited military solution as opposed to an all-out invasion. These reasons are both political as well as economic. Since the very first day of his election, President Ahmadinejad has not hidden his deep admiration for the 1980s as a golden era. Politically, the 1980s was marked by what Ayatollah Khomeini called the "unity of words." There was no open talk of Left or Right in the political spectrum. There was only one party and that was Hezbollah (the Party of God)[i]. You were either with the party of God or with the "infidels." Socially, there was virtually no room for any form of freedom. The state interfered with every aspect of people's private lives. Scenes of the regime's agents raiding houses and arresting people for no crime other than cheering and dancing at a wedding party were quite ordinary. At roadblocks and checkpoints, the armed men searched almost every car that passed by, not really hoping to find anything obviously illegal, such as weapons or drugs, but simple things such as music cassettes. The situation with the press was much worse than it is now. Not even mild criticisms were tolerated. In fact, the regime saw to it that nobody with that mindset would even be allowed to work for the press. The country's economy was completely controlled by the state. Everything was either owned or totally controlled and regulated by the government. Economy was really the art of giving out rations of life's necessities. Anything more than that was considered luxury at the time, which by definition was a symbol of the corrupt lifestyle of the royalty that existed before the revolution. All this could easily be justified by the fact that the country was engaged in a devastating and costly war, not just with Saddam Hussein's Iraq, but effectively with the whole World, including and especially the West, headed by the United States. The war provided a platform for the regime's political, social, as well as economical monopoly. Economic Troubles Ahead Ahmadinejad got almost all the votes that he did not get through vote-rigging, by making promises for bringing economic prosperity; promises to "bring the oil to people's dining tables," as he put it in his campaign speeches. Soon after he took office, he denied having ever said that. The government spokesman jokingly said that the government would not bring oil to people's dining tables, "because it has a bad smell." Ahmadinejad also promised to fight what he called "the oil mafia." When Ali Saeedloo, Vice-President for Executive Affairs, who at one time was nominated for the post of ministry of oil, was asked who this oil mafia really is, he answered, "I do not know. Why don't you ask the president himself?" "The government's trial period is over," Hashemi Rafsanjani. During the first year of his presidency, Ahmadinejad tried to dismiss all the criticisms of his economic failures by either attributing the problems to "hidden hands behind the scenes" hands whose identity he never revealed or by simply saying that it is too early to make any judgments about the administration's failure or success. The time has now passed: His presidency is almost half-way through, and as his rival Hashemi Rafsanjani noted in one of his recent interviews, "the government's trial period is over" (Trait). Economic troubles, in the meantime, have nothing but worsened, and there is no indication of this changing for the better in the coming year. Ahmadinejad's budget plan for the new Iranian year is a clear indication of his troubles ahead. Huge spending on operational expenses (i.e. paying salaries to government employees, handing out short-term loans, etc.) assuming that his government can somehow manage to find the money is predicted by experts to cause double-digit inflation rates. This is aside from the effect of sudden reduction of the gasoline subsidies a move that neither the government nor the parliament are still quite sure about. Also, according to the research center of the currently right-wing controlled parliament, the projected earnings of the government will only be realized if the average oil price per barrel would stay close to US$52 more than 20 dollars above the price on which the budget has been seemingly laid out (Iranian Parliament Research Center). The government traditionally acquired funds for development projects by issuing bonds. This is known to have a long-term effect on the budget plans of the years to follow. This year, Ahmadinejad will also have to pay the dues for redeeming the bonds issued during Khatami's presidency. It is therefore essential for them to keep the oil prices up. Creating tension would be one way to do it. Ahmadinejad's economical problems will not simply stop at the budget, however. With the 1980s model of governance, he has shown a strong tendency against privatization, even though the country's five-year development plans, and the two-decade growth outlook both demand that the government moves towards privatization and downsizing. If Ahmadinejad moves on with his trend of enlarging the government again, he will lose some of the income past governments have assembled through selling government-owned companies and businesses to the private sector. This will make his government even more reliant on the oil income. Additionally, a limited conflict, or even some pseudo-conflict that can be sold to the public as a viable and real threat, will give Ahmadinejad the perfect scapegoat, blaming the US and the West at large for his failing economic policies; not to mention the fact that in the event that such a conflict does occur, all criticism of government policies would not even be allowed to be voiced. US Presidential Elections In 2004, President George W. Bush was reelected despite the fact that by that time it had become clear that his main reason for invading Iraq, i.e. weapons of mass destruction, was based on false intelligence and therefore unjustified. If one is to disregard claims that in order to win the reelection the GOP too committed serious campaign violations in many states, including in the deciding state of Ohio, the only alternative explanation offered by some analysts for Bush's victory is that public's overall perception at the time was that the best person to "clean up the mess," so to speak, would be the person who made it in the first place; that the Iraqi situation needed to be sorted out, not hastily abandoned, as was likely to be done by the Democrats. In the November 2006 congressional elections, the message was quite clear: People's patience is "wearing thin."In the November 2006 congressional elections however, the message was quite clear: People's patience is "wearing thin," as Zalmai Khalilzad put it, and they could not trust the Republicans with Iraq anymore. It might sound like a far-fetched idea, but the only thing that could put a "Neo-con" policy back on the map for the 2008 presidential election is most probably another crisis such as a war. With lessons learned from Iraq, this time the Americans might be looking for a limited conflict, one that has a very low chance of failure, requires no long-term troops commitments, yet is significant enough to make them look like the saviors of the world against "the most dangerous nation in the world." Iran is the only country that fits the profile; thanks in no small part to Ahmadinejad's adventurism. Regional Factors With the understandable exception of Kuwait, and partly Saudi Arabia, many Arab states were not very happy about the prospect of a US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Countries like the UAE lost a lot of tourism revenue during the weeks and months following America's attack on Iraq. Other governments simply feared the public reaction to any cooperation with the Americans in an invasion of another Arab country. Not only is this not the case with Iran, many countries including Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, and Jordan would very much like Iran to be "contained," to say the least. Saudi Arabia and Jordan have not concealed their concerns with the formation of the Iranian-supported "Shiite Crescent", in Iraq and in Lebanon (Wright and Baker). The UAE is already a huge absorbent of Iranian capital. More than 400,000 Iranians are estimated to have already invested up to US$200 billion in Dubai, mostly in the real estate business (Iran Daily). In event of any conflict, this figure will undoubtedly increase. Qatar, which shares vast oil and gas reserves with Iran, would very much enjoy seeing Iran engaged with some pressing issue that keeps it from further developing its oil and gas exploration and production plans just like it did during the eight-year Iran-Iraq war. Although these countries might not want to be actively involved in any military conflict between Iran and the United States, their sheer political support and blessing would make America's job much easier. All this should be added to Israel's desire for an "allied" attack on Iran, albeit a limited one against its military and nuclear infrastructure. The fate of Iran and the entire Middle East region is at crossroads. Forces both within and without would like to see Iran engage in some sort of military confrontation with the West, especially the United States. It is up to pragmatic and moderate minds on both sides to recognize this desire for conflict and try to balance and contain the reckless. It is also crucial that the people Iranians as well as Americans be careful not to fall into populist traps of their hardliner governments. When Ahmadinejad uses Iran's "ancient history" one which they always tried to play down against Iran's "Islamic identity" to appeal to people's nationalist sentiment, we Iranians should not be fooled. When Dick Cheney still insists on links existing between pre-2003 Iraq and Al-Qaeda, the American people should understand what he is really after: to still present war as a justifiable solution to any perceived problem. Sources: Ansari, Ali. "Comment: 'Not a Time for Hyperbole or Mislaid Threats'." Times Online. 30 March 2007. Accessed 22 April 2007. "Capital Flight to Dubai Worrisome." Iran Daily, 8 March 2006. Accessed 22 April 2007. "Interview With US Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns." BBC. 29 March 2007. Accessed 22 April 2007. "Full Implementation of the Budget Would Be Impossible With an Oil Price Less Than US$52 per Barrel." Iranian Parliament Research Center. Accessed 22 April 2007. Trait, Robet. "Ahmadinejad Challenged for Control of Iran's Economy." Guardian Unlimited. 7 March, 2007. Accessed 22 April 2007. Wright, Robin and Peter Baker. "Iraq, Jordan See Threat To Election From Iran." Washington Post. 8 December 2004. Accessed 22 April 2007. --------------------------------- Arash Jalaliis an Iranian computer engineer who lives in Iran. He occasionally writes articles for several blogs. Send Response to [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] { Views expressed by writer are their own property } Muhammed Shariq Khan Lucknow, India Catch me on ORKUT http://www.orkut.com/Profile.aspx?uid=14456057799084714724 Send instant messages to your online friends http://uk.messenger.yahoo.com