"The Qur’an refers to two groups of people: the
Hizbullah and the Hizbu-Shaytan; there is no room for any other group or
party. In Pakistan, as indeed everywhere else in the Muslim world, those
who are not for the Islamic State are automatically part of the Hizbu-Shaytan."
wallahu 'alam. wassalam
http://www.muslimedia.com/zafar-pak.htm
Title: The potential for Islamic Revolution in Pakistan May 16-31, 2000 / PakistanThe potential for Islamic Revolution in Pakistan
by Zafar Bangash
[Crescent International, May 16-31, 2000.]
Pakistan's tragedy is not merely that its ruling elites are corrupt and incompetent, for this is the case with elites throughout much of the Muslim world: the tragedy is the sterile thinking that continues to prescribe the same failed policies that have brought Pakistan to its sorry state in the first place. That the country is on the verge of political and economic collapse is now admitted even by the practitioners of statecraft; it has even earned the dubious distinction of a ‘failed State.’ Seldom discussed, however, are the reasons for its failure. During military rule, there is clamour for a civilian government; when the civilians are in power–whether feudal lords or industrial barons–there are calls for the military to take over and restore ‘law and order,’ as if simply changing faces would solve problems.
Pakistan’s fundamental dilemma lies in the unresolved dichotomy between the wishes of the masses, who want an Islamic State and had so desired at the time of its creation, and the country’s ruling elites, who could only produce a secular nation-state in the image of their masters’ vision. This crisis of identity is at the root of all the problems in Pakistan. The late Dr Kalim Siddiqui (1931-1996) was perhaps the only scholar who clearly understood this, and repeatedly pointed out this dichotomy. He also underlined the failure of the Islamic political parties and placed them squarely in the corner of the western-created and western-imposed political institutions. The Islamic parties’ repeated failures to secure any support in elections held under the secular system have confirmed Dr Kalim's analysis.
Dr Kalim Siddiqui asserted that the country’s only chance of survival was in an Iran-style Islamic Revolution. This can only come about, he emphasized, if a number of prerequisites are first realized. Foremost among these is the emergence of a muttaqi leadership. He disqualified all those, whether feudal lords, industrial barons or shortsighted financiers, the military officer-class or the civilian bureaucracy, who had brought Pakistan to its present state, from having any further role in its future set-up. The muttaqi leadership can only emerge from the roots of Islam, i.e., from among the ulama. While there may not be any identifiable personality at present to lead such a movement, given Pakistan’s peculiar experience with the ulama it would be unwise to dismiss them altogether from a future role, he argued.
It may sound ironic to talk about the potential for an Islamic Revolution in Pakistan when it should have been a model for the Ummah. It is the only country in the world to have been created in the name of Islam. In 1947 when Pakistan came into existence, Muslims throughout the world rejoiced and looked to it as a "fortress of Islam." That its own rulers have been busy demolishing its walls and foundations since is one of the saddest parts of Pakistan’s tortuous history.
Pakistan’s destiny was subverted at its very creation. The western-educated and western-created elites in the Muslim League who led the Pakistan movement knew little or nothing about Islam. They had been weaned on western thought and ideas in which subservience to the British raj was considered to be of paramount importance. But they also realized that the Muslim masses would only respond to the call of Islam. So they mixed nationalism with Islamic rhetoric in their demand for the creation of a state separate from Hindu-dominated India. For the Muslim masses Pakistan meant the revival of the period of the Khulafa ar-Rashidoon. In fact, the masses’ enthusiasm for an Islamic State in Pakistan was not entirely misplaced; it was barely 23 years earlier that the Khilafah had been abolished in Turkey, much to the distress and anger of Muslims worldwide, especially in India. The demand for Pakistan was viewed by the Muslim masses as the first step in the re-establishment of a fundamental institution of Islam: the Islamic State. The elites, however, had other ideas.
Two points need to made before proceeding further. Pakistan is important because it represented the wishes of the indigenous Muslim population in British-ruled India for a homeland of their own. Some people have compared it with the zionist state of Israel, which was also created in the name of a religion. Such comparisons are not only perverse, they are also wrong because the zionist entity was planted in the heartland of Islam as a colonial-settler enterprise. It has been nurtured by western handouts and has helped keep the heartland of Islam divided and in turmoil. Pakistan, on the other hand, reflected the deepest aspirations of Muslim peoples who had lived there for nearly a thousand years.
Second, Pakistan, like any other Muslim country, must not be viewed merely as a geographic entity. Its survival is the concern of all Muslims throughout the world because Allah subhanahu wa ta'ala describes the Muslims as one Ummah (21:92) and the Prophet, upon whom be peace, has repeatedly emphasized Muslim unity and concern for each other’s well-being. Any geographical or physical barriers dividing Muslims are artificial and unacceptable. Pakistan’s future and well-being cannot be separated from the well-being of the Ummah itself. Every Muslim, no matter where he lives in the world, is duty-bound to participate in the well-being of Pakistan as of any other part of the Ummah, be it Palestine, Kashmir or Bosnia. This was the position consistently articulated with great eloquence by Dr Kalim Siddiqui in all his writings and speeches. It was also this understanding that led him to become such a staunch defender and supporter of the Islamic Revolution in Iran.
Pakistan’s current plight reflects another irony. Three of the five regions bordering Pakistan have either undergone an Islamic revolution (Iran), have had jihad movements (Afghanistan) or are in the throes of jihad at present (Kashmir). Almost all sectors of the population in Pakistan, including the ruling elites, admit that Iran has taken control of its own destiny since the Islamic revolution, that the Red Army was defeated in Afghanistan as a result of jihad, and that jihad is the only way to liberate Kashmir from the clutches of a tyrannical India. Yet the same elites are averse to any mention of jihad or Islamic revolution in Pakistan. This is further compounded by the role the Islamic political parties have played by participating in the western-imposed system and confusing the masses about its true nature.
Before we consider the potential for an Islamic revolution in Pakistan, there is need to admit some harsh realities in order to wipe the slate clean. Without such cleansing, it would be difficult to move forward. Pakistan's independence from Britain in 1947 was fraudulent; it emerged with a "Dominion" status, complete with a governor general and a bureaucracy, but soon fell into the deathly embrace of the US. Throughout its existence, successive governments have invested enormous energies to secure the non-existent goodwill of the US. The US was allowed to use Pakistan's territory to advance the American agenda in the cold war, to the great detriment of its own people. After the end of the cold war, Pakistan was left out in the cold. At partition, Pakistan had no external debt; today it has an external debt of US$42 billion. More than 80 percent of all its revenues are consumed by debt-servicing and defence expenditure. Not only has its financial and political future been mortgaged to western lending institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, but the complete subservience of the ruling elites to the west amounts to shirk.
It is the hallmark of all ruling elites that the more they are alienated from their own people, the greater is their need for external support and subservience. So they become extremely oppressive and tyrannical at home because they have to take the masses in a direction in which they do not wish to go. The alienation of the ruling elites from the masses in Pakistan is total. The gap between the rich and poor is widening; while the elites live a life of rapacious extravagance, the masses suffer great hardships and poverty. This is compounded by corruption, which has reached dizzying heights. Every ruler in Pakistan for the last 10 to 12 years has publicly admitted that corruption is rampant but then proceeded to indulge in even greater excesses.
One last point about the behaviour of the Pakistani elites is in order. Throughout its 53-year existence, the country's elites have made a great show of their enmity to India because of its illegal occupation of Kashmir and the brutal campaign of terror currently under way there. They have vowed not to rest until they have liberated Kashmir. Like their commitment to Islam, their enmity to India is also a fraud. There is far more common ground between the Muslim and Hindu ruling elites than there is between either elite and its poverty-stricken masses. The elites in both countries have similar tastes in food, entertainment, lifestyle, recreation, and so forth. Their children go to similar schools in their own countries and end up in the same institutions in the US and Britain in Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Oxford, Cambridge, London and so on. The only difference seems to be that the Hindu elites are a little less corrupt and a lot more sincere in their pronouncements than their Pakistani counterparts.
Enough has been said about what is wrong with the system and the ruling elites in Pakistan. We now need to turn our attention to the potential for an Islamic revolution. Despite decades of forced secularization and westernization, the overwhelming majority of the people have remained deeply attached to Islam. Only this can explain the elites’ systematic attempts to hide behind the veil of ‘Islamicity’ while they are committed to secularism and to subservience of the west. Beyond symbolic gestures, however, there is a need for the emergence of what Dr Kalim Siddiqui called muttaqi leadership to lead the Islamic movement to turn Pakistan into a genuine Islamic State (its official name at the moment is the "Islamic Republic of Pakistan"!). This muttaqi leadership must emerge from the ulama who are uncontaminated by western thought and influence and who have no class or personal interests. Although he himself was educated in the west, Dr Kalim emphasized that western-educated elites have no role to play in leadership positions in the Islamic State. He said that the western-educated elites can only operate a western-imposed system, which is at the root of all the problems of Pakistan and indeed of all other Muslim countries (with the exception of Iran since the Islamic revolution).
Dr Kalim Siddiqui also stressed that there was an urgent need to eliminate all traces of nationalism from the mentality of Muslims. In Pakistan, nationalism has led to the emergence of such tendencies as provincialism and parochialism as well as sectarianism. Aware that his call for the ulama to lead the masses would raise questions about their absence from the political scene for more than 50 years, Dr Kalim pointed to the great role played by the ulama in Iran, who had also abstained from direct participation in politics for their entire history. Further, in India there has been a long and rich tradition of the ulama's struggle, starting with Shaikh Ahmed Sirhindi (d.1624 CE) in the seventeenth century, who was succeeded by such great figures as Shah Waliullah of Delhi (d.1763), and Syed Ahmed and Shah Ismail, both of whom were martyred at Balakot while fighting the Sikhs in 1831. The last two actually led a jihad movement and performed hijrah (migration) in following the Sunnah of the noble Messenger of Allah. This is a great legacy for the Islamic movement in Pakistan to build on.
The potential for an Islamic revolution in Pakistan has never been greater because the secular elites have failed so completely. This they have themselves openly admitted. Similarly, there is great awakening among the masses, who have rejected the existing system. This has been repeatedly demonstrated by their lack of participation in the electoral fraud enacted for the last 12 years. The electorates’ turnout, even according to official figures, was never more than 25 percent. The true figures are certainly much lower. Another indication of the masses’ desire for an Islamic revolution is the wish, heard frequently, for an "Imam Khomeini-style leader" in Pakistan.
While excluding the existing civilian and military elites from any further role in Pakistan, Dr Kalim Siddiqui had identified a number of institutions that could serve as assets for a future Islamic revolution.
1: Masajid
There are thousands of masajid throughout Pakistan. Most of their khateebs and imams are involved in peripheral issues. Some even promote sectarianism. This is of course deliberately encouraged and financed in order to undermine the influence in Pakistan of Iran's Islamic revolution. It is not difficult to see who would benefit from such divisions in Pakistan: the Saudi regime, Iraq, the US and their agents in Pakistan. But the number of imams promoting sectarianism is relatively small. In fact, once the higher goal and purpose of the Islamic revolution is articulated, they will rise above such petty differences. Those who continue to indulge in sectarianism will find themselves isolated and marginalised in an environment that aims to promote the pristine principles and goals of Islam.
2: Deeni madaris and ulama
According to the most conservative estimates, there are at least 2,000 (and perhaps as many as 6,000) madaris in Pakistan. The fact that these institutions have been targeted by the Pakistani secularists on behalf of their US masters reflects their potential role in an Islamic revolution in Pakistan.
Despite a vicious propaganda campaign, neither all the madaris nor all ulama promote sectarianism. The vast majority are for Muslim unity. Such madaris and ulama must not only be identified but also encouraged to play their rightful role in society. After all, if students from such madaris can be motivated to participate in jihad in Afghanistan, Kashmir, Chechenya and Bosnia, why can they not be motivated to participate in the jihad against tyranny and oppression at home?
3: Secular, western-style institutions
While the secular western-style institutions were established to undermine the deeni madaris, Islamic awareness is spreading even among students there. One of the great blessings of a Muslim society is that secularisation and westernisation affect severely only a thin veneer at the top; the vast majority remain attached to Islam. An inspiring glimpse of this was seen during the revolution against the Shah's regime in Iran, when jeans-clad girls hurled stones at the army. Young people educated in the secular institutions of Pakistan will play a similar role and will be a great asset for the Islamic revolution.
4: The rural population
The rural population, comprising the overwhelming majority in Pakistan, is largely uncontaminated by secular western ideas. They may be poor but they have pride and dignity; they may not be highly educated but they are highly motivated. Moreover, their attachment to Islam is beyond question. Another important factor is that they make the bulk of the rank and file of the army. When the Islamic revolution occurs in Pakistan, the military and civilian elites will try to crush it, but the rank and file of the army, unlike the Shah's army in Iran, will disobey orders to shoot their own kith and kin. There is far too much Islamic awareness and common decency in the Pakistan army for them to indulge in any such carnage. The officer class will soon be isolated, signalling the end of the game for the imposed order.
5: Workers and the urban poor
This is another group which is greatly exploited. Comprising most of the population in major urban centres, they have always offered great sacrifices,–for Pakistan as well as for every movement against tyrannical rulers. This was seen during the movements to overthrow Ayub Khan and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, for instance. The two most successful movements in Pakistan’s history were those for the creation of Pakistan and against Bhutto’s regime in 1977. In both, it will be noted, the elites used the name of Islam to mobilise the masses. The movement against Bhutto was projected as a struggle to establish Nizam-e Mustafa (the system established by the Prophet, upon whom be peace). The military struck when it realised that the movement was getting out of control and could bring down the entire system. The leadership of the movement against Bhutto was also exposed as being opportunistic and insincere to Islam; their sole purpose was to use the masses to get rid of Bhutto, not to enforce Islam. The urban poor will make even greater sacrifices for the Islamic revolution which will free society from the injustices and exploitation that currently pervade it. The workers and urban poor know about such suffering from firsthand experience, and have the will and the ability to bring about change.
6: Conflict between kufr & Islam
The west, which represents the power of kufr, has declared open war on Islam and every manifestation of it. The west and its media call it "Islamic fundamentalism," or even "terrorism." If there are any Muslims who still have doubts about the west’s total animosity to Islam, they should consider this: the west and its mouthpieces have labelled the Hizbullah in Lebanon and Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine "terrorist" organisations although they are fighting to liberate their land from the clutches of zionism. The Islamic movements in Algeria and Egypt are similarly branded; even the mujahideen in Chechenya and Kashmir are being given negative appellations, as if fighting to free one’s homeland and protect the honour of one's mothers, daughters and sisters were a crime.
The Islamic movement in Pakistan should harbour no illusions about the west’s role and its animosity to Islam. Similarly, the Islamic movement must clearly identify the west’s agents in Pakistan who promote its agenda against the wishes and interests of its people.
7: Muttaqi leadership
Muttaqi leadership is present but has not made its presence felt in Pakistan. The fundamental reason, according to Dr Kalim Siddiqui, is that Islamic political parties have absorbed many of the muttaqi and committed Muslims. One of the debilitating influences of the ‘Islamic’ political parties has been that they force even muttaqi people into compromises. Only the Islamic movement can provide the framework in which such compromises will not be forced upon Muslims. When it is made clear that all traces of western influence must be eliminated, then the leadership will develop self-confidence, the will and taqwa to face such challenges and not be cowed by the secularist onslaught.
The leadership’s reference point will then become the Qur'an, the Sunnah and Seerah of the noble Mesenger of Allah (saw), not the UN charter or so-called international law, which is a euphemism for western interests above all. It will seek the pleasure of Allah, not of Uncle Sam. This will automatically bring the leadership closer to the masses. When muttaqi leadership and humble masses come together, they will become a force that no weapons or force can defeat.
Today all the ingredients for an Islamic revolution in Pakistan are present. Again, the blessings of an Islamic society are evident everywhere. Despite all the evils of corruption, graft, nepotism and fraud, the inherent decency of the people and their deep love for Islam come through clearly. Westernization has managed to affect only the surface of Pakistani society.
The Islamic revolution, however, will not come about of its own volition. It will require clarity of thought and vision and a great deal of hard work. The first step is to have much clearer lines of communication with the masses. The thousands of masajid and madaris are extremely important avenues for this. The Islamic movement will have to develop close links with them in order to realise their true potential. Other vehicles, such as newspapers and magazines of the Islamic movement, must also be developed to get the ideas across, although the dismal literacy rate in the country will be a handicap. But Islamic ideas will find a ready and receptive audience. It is much easier to get the Islamic message across by bypassing the din currently created by the secular media.
Two groups must emerge immediately to act as the support arm of the Islamic movement in Pakistan. Let us call them the Fidayan-e Islam and Jihad for Reconstruction. The first must provide protection in neighbourhoods, because the police force is not only thoroughly corrupt but completely despised and distrusted. The Fidayan can also act as dispute-resolution committees, freeing people from the cumbersome court system, where people can find no justice. The Fidayan will give the masses an opportunity to see the Islamic movement in operation, thereby earning their trust, as well as build their self-confidence for the much greater struggle ahead.
The Jihad for Reconstruction will help develop the spirit of self-help among the people. Today there is complete breakdown of almost all services in Pakistan. There is no clean drinking water, almost everything is polluted -- from the environment to medicines, leading to unnecessary early deaths of children as well as adults. Following the pattern of work undertaken in Iran, the Jihad for Reconstruction in Pakistan can help the rural population with agriculture, protection of crops and fruits, and building houses and roads. This will help to bring parts of the Islamic movement in Pakistan closer to each other and to the rural majority. This is a large undertaking and will not be realised in a short time, but a beginning must be made as soon as possible. The Islamic movement will have to deliver services instead of rhetoric, as has been the habit of elite-dominated political parties, in order to win the confidence of the people.
The ruling elites have completely run out of ideas and have failed so miserably that there is no room for them to play any further role in governing society. Pakistan can ill afford to run between the fascism of the feudals and the boot of the military. As Malek Bennabi, the Algerian writer, observed after the June 1967 debacle, the Arab regimes need a fresh stock of ideas, not a fresh stock of the weapons that brought about their defeat in the first place. The same goes for Pakistan. Everything else has been tried and has failed. The people cannot remain mired in the past; there is a need to move towards Islamic revolution.
This will not, however, come about through American aid; it will only come through Islamic struggle and sacrifices. This is what we learn from the Seerah of the Prophet, upon whom be peace. Through his uswatan hasana (noble character), the Prophet showed a practical example of how a society steeped in jahiliyya can be transformed into a muttaqi and God-fearing society. The Qur’an refers to two groups of people: the Hizbullah and the Hizbu-Shaytan; there is no room for any other group or party. In Pakistan, as indeed everywhere else in the Muslim world, those who are not for the Islamic State are automatically part of the Hizbu-Shaytan.
The struggle to turn Pakistan into the Islamic State will not be easy, but the alternative is annihilation. This is the stark choice facing the people of Pakistan as well as Muslims worldwide. The destruction of Pakistan, God forbid, will be a great blow to the Ummah of Islam. Every effort must be made to prevent it, but time is running out. No civilization, much less an Islamic civilization, has ever emerged on borrowed money or borrowed ideas. The Islamic civilization in Pakistan must be based on the values of Islam, or it cannot be Islamic.
Zafar Bangash is Director of the Institute of Contemporary Islamic Thought. This paper was presented at the Kalim Siddiqui Memorial Seminar convened by the ICIT and Crescent International in London on May 7.
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