> Self-signed certs bring only confusion, IMO: they are nothing more than a > raw key with an unsubstantiated claim to another name, along with a whole > lot more ASN.1 baggage beyond what is needed to parse the modulo and > exponent. > > And you don't get usage or policy restrictions without a CA that the > *HOMENET* trusts to assert them, nor can that sort of policy assertion be > done with device certs since I don't have any reason to believe fly-by-night's > routers should be allowed to do whatever it is they claim they want to do.
No, this would only be true if there were an implied authorization to go along with the authentication. That's why it's so important for the user to have to take an initial step of providing authorization (in the event where the user has chosen to secure homenet -- of course the use should have the option not to force homenet to run securely, just like the user can choose to run Wi-Fi without security or not to push the buttons on powerline networking devices [distinct from the buttons on Wi-Fi devices] in order to create a secure powerline network). Since the user should be responsible for providing authorization, and authentication should be completely separated from authorization, the key is *only* for authentication. The key would only need to be revoked if it were believed that some other device were using the key (the key to device association could no longer be trusted). Revoking authorization is done by changing the role that a device using the key is allowed to perform. The user should be able to do this. And then the same mechanism used to provide new devices with the key/role list can be used to supply all devices with the updated key/role list. If a key is associated with a "guest" role, it shouldn't be necessary to delete that entry in the key/role list unless the user really wants to make sure that the device is not allowed to come back again as a guest. A user who cares to should be able to edit the key/role list whenever they like (including deleting entries). But a user who does not choose to ever edit the list when there is no evidence of a problem would be fine. A "friendly name" is important. But that's becoming important to so many things in the home network. Barbara _______________________________________________ homenet mailing list homenet@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/homenet
