Hi!

I conducted an AD review of draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-05.  Thanks 
for the work in getting this document written.  My most significant items are 
around aligning of the text in Section 4 with RFC8329 and the dependency on 
draft-dong-i2nsf-asf-config-01.  My detailed feedback is below.  

(1)     IDNits returned the following valid comment about references (many of 
the issue is noted were in the YANG module)
  == Missing Reference: 'RFC3688' is mentioned on line 1764, but not defined

(2)     Section 1.  Typo. s/[draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability]../ 
[draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability]./

(3)     Section 3.  Is there a reason to rely on two expired drafts for 
terminology -- [draft-ietf-i2nsf-terminology] and 
[draft-ietf-supa-generic-policy-info-model]?  In particular, couldn't RFC3444 
provide the needed definitions of data and information models?

(4)     Section 4.  I would have expected somewhere in this overview section an 
explicit enumeration of which I2NSF interfaces use this YANG module.

(5)     Section 4.  Per "Figure 1 shows the capabilities of NSFs in I2NSF 
Framework."
-- Thanks for reusing the diagram from RFC8329 and annotating it with more 
detail.  It helps connect the documents
-- It wasn't clear to me where the "capabilities" are on the diagram
-- Is all of the detail under the NSFs (i.e., E, C and A) needed in the 
diagram?  Text doesn't explain it or reference it.  If kept, it should be 
explained and E, C and A should be defined (i.e., saying these correspond to 
Event, Condition and Action)

(6)     Global.  Editorial. Is there a reason to abbreviate "Mgmt" in 
"Developer's Mgmt System in the text?  Recommend s/Developer's Mgmt 
System/Developer's Management System/g

(7)     Section 4.  Per "To register NSFs in this way, the Developer's Mgmt 
System utilizes this standardized capabilities YANG data model through its 
registration interface.", this confused me a bit.  Doesn't the Developer 
Management System use the model described in 
draft-ietf-i2nsf-registration-interface-dm for registration?

(8)     Section 4.  Editorial. Per "... those security devices can be easily 
managed, ...", I might have used "more easily managed".

(9)     Section 4.  Per "The use cases are described below.", where are those 
use cases described?  Is this text a reference to the "Configuration Examples" 
in Appendix A?

(10)     Section 4.  Per "Note that the NSF-Facing Interface ... and the NSF 
Monitoring Interface is used to ...", does this text need additional precision 
based on the definitions in RFC8329.  Per RFC8329, the "NSF-Facing Interfaces" 
consists of the "NSF Operational and Administrative Interface" and a 
"Monitoring Interface". If draft-dong-i2nsf-asf-config is on the "Monitoring 
Interface", on which "sub-interface" of the "NSF-Facing Interface" does 
draft-ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm belong?

(11)     Figure 1.  Editorial Nit.  Is there are reason that the Registration 
interface has a bidirectional arrow between the network operator management 
system and the developer management system, but the there is no directionality 
on the consumer or NSF facing interface?

(12)     Section 4.  The bulleted list under Figure 1 is helpful in describing 
Figure 1.  However, I'd recommend explicitly saying this is an example.  
Explain the use case up front and then narrate the flow clearly delineating 
what is in and out of scope of I2NSF.  IMO, the text describes a number of 
internal processing functions which are in scope for standardization - please 
let me know if I'm reading it wrong.

(13)    Section 4.  Per "If network manager wants to block malicious users with 
IPv6, the network manager sends the security policy rules to block the users to 
the Network Operator Mgmt System using I2NSF user ....", can you please clarify 
"malicious users with IPv6"; is the intent that the network manager is 
concerned about malicious IPv6 traffic?

(14)    Section 4.  Bullet 1 under Figure 1.  Per "a web browser or a 
software", what's the difference between a browser and software?  

(15)    Section 4.  Editorial.  Per the second bullet under Figure 1, "If NSFs 
encounter the malicious packets, it is a tremendous burden for the network 
manager to apply the rule to block the malicious packets to NSFs one-by-one.  
This problem can be resolved by managing the capabilities of NSFs.", delete 
this text.  It is a duplicate of what was stated in the first bullet.

(16)    Section 4.  Per the paragraph, "If NSFs encounter the suspicious IPv4 
packets, they can ask the Network Operator Mgmt System for information about 
the suspicious IPv4 packets in order to alter specific rules and/or 
configurations.  When the Network ...", how much of that signaling is in scope 
for I2NSF?

(17)    Section 4.  Typo. s/suspiciou/suspicious/

(18)    Section 5.1. Editorial.  s/The model includes NSF capabilities/The 
model describes NSF capabilities/

(19)    Section 5.1. Editorial. "specify" is used twice in the sentence.
OLD
Time capabilities are used to specify the capabilities to specify when to 
execute the I2NSF policy rule.  
NEW
Time capabilities are used to specify the capabilities which describe when to 
execute the I2NSF policy rule.  

(20)    Section 5.1. Editorial.  This sentence didn't parse for me.  The second 
contains duplicate text.
OLD
Event capabilities are used to specify capabilities how to trigger the 
evaluation of the condition clause of the I2NSF Policy Rule.  The defined event 
capabilities are defined as system event and system alarm.
NEW
Event capabilities are used to specify the capabilities that describe the event 
that would trigger the evaluation of the condition clause of the I2NSF Policy 
Rule.  The defined event capabilities are system event and system alarm.

(21)    Section 5.1.  A number of capabilities note that they can be extended 
which is a helpful feature.  For example, "The condition capability can be 
extended according to specific vendor condition features."  However, where is 
the guidance on doing that?  Likewise, it might not be necessary to repeat this 
statement five times if the extension mechanism is the same.

(22)    Section 5.1.  A number of the described capability types state that 
they are described in detail in draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability.  For example, "The 
condition capability is described in detail in [draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability]."  
I had difficulty locating which specific section to review.  Also, for the 
default action capabilities, no described of "pass, drop .. mirror" was found 
in draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability.  Please provide a specific section number for 
the event, condition, action, resolution strategy and default action in 
draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability.

(23)    Section 5.1.  Editorial.  These sentences didn't parse for me.
OLD
Action capabilities are used to specify capabilities of how to control and 
monitor aspects of flow-based NSFs when the event and condition clauses are 
satisfied.  
NEW
Action capabilities are used to specify the capabilities that describe the 
control and monitoring aspects of flow-based NSFs when the event and condition 
clauses are satisfied.  

OLD
Resolution strategy capabilities are used to specify capabilities of how to 
resolve conflicts that occur between the actions of the same or different 
policy rules that are matched and contained in this particular NSF.  
NEW
Resolution strategy capabilities are used to specify the capabilities that 
describe conflicts that occur between the actions of the same or different 
policy rules that are matched and contained in this particular NSF.  

OLD
Default action capabilities are used to specify capabilities of how to execute 
I2NSF policy rules when no rule matches a packet.
NEW
Default action capabilities are used to specify the capabilities that describe 
how to execute I2NSF policy rules when no rule matches a packet.    

(24)    Section 6.1.  Update the copyright date and revision date to be in 2020.

(25)    Section 6.1.  Given that draft-ietf-i2nf-monitoring-data-model is 
referenced in the YANG model for event and system alarm, please make it a 
normative reference.

(26)    Section 6.1. identity ingress/egress-action-capability.  I found 
draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-04 to be an unexpected reference.  There is no 
mention of ingress or egress in that document.

(27)    Section 6.1. identity pass, drop, reject, alert, mirror.  I found 
draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-04 to be an unexpected reference.  There is no 
mention of pass, drop, reject, alert or mirror in that document.

(28)    Section 6.1.  In the advanced-nsf-capability section, there are 
multiple normative references to draft-dong-i2nsf-asf-config-01, an expired, 
individual draft.  Additionally, Section 4 notes how it supports the advanced 
capabilities. This draft is a substantial portion of the YANG module added in 
-03.  What's the plan on resolving this dependency?  

(29)    Section 6.1. Typo. s/Funtion/Function/

(30)    Section 6.1.  The list of references in generic-nsf-capabilities don't 
line up with those in the child leaflist(s).  For example, RFC 792 is mentioned 
in the top level reference list but not in any of the child leaflist 
(specifically not in leaf-list icmp-capability)

(31)    Section 6.1. Typo. s/smae/same/

(32)    Section 8.  A few clarifying updates to the template:
OLD
These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network 
environments.  Write operations (e.g., edit-config) to these data nodes without 
proper protection can have a negative effect on network operations.
ietf-i2nsf-capability: The attacker may provide incorrect information of the 
security capability of any target NSF by illegally modifying this.

NEW
These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network 
environments.  Write operations to these data nodes could have a negative 
effect on network and security operations.
ietf-i2nsf-capability: An attacker could alter the security capabilities 
associated with an NSF whereby disabling or enabling the evasion of security 
mitigations. 

OLD
ietf-i2nsf-capability: The attacker may gather the security capability 
information of any target NSF and misuse the information for subsequent attacks.
NEW
ietf-i2nsf-capability: An attacker could gather the security capability 
information of any NSF and use this information to evade detection or filtering.

Regards,
Roman

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