Hi,

A couple of additions (in blue this time, and surrounded by asterisks anyway) 
that came to my mind reviewing the agendas and documents of related WG 
(specifically, s:

Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) provides security *function* 
vendors *users, and operators* with a standard framework and interfaces for 
cloud-based security services. I2NSF enables the enforcement of a high-level 
security policy, *expressed according to a user's perspective of the target 
network*. This security policy enforcement in I2NSF is a data-driven approach 
using NETCONF/YANG or RESTCONF/YANG, where a security policy is constructed 
*based on a YANG data model*.

The I2NSF framework consists of four components such as I2NSF User, Security 
Controller, Network Security Function (NSF), and Developer's Management System 
(DMS). The 2NSF User specifies a high-level security policy for a target 
network. The Security Controller *is aware of the capabilities of the attached 
NSFs, using them to build the security service(s) satisfying the policy 
expressed by the I2NSF User*. An NSF *provides a set of* specific security 
*capabilities* (e.g., firewalling, web filtering, packet inspection, 
DDOS-attack mitigation…), *applying* security policy rules. The DMS registers 
the capabilities of an NSF with the Security Controller.

The I2NSF framework has four interfaces such as Consumer-Facing Interface, 
NSF-Facing Interface, Registration Interface, and Monitoring Interface. 
Consumer-Facing Interface is used to deliver high-level security policies from 
the I2NSF User to the Security Controller. NSF-Facing Interface is used to 
deliver low-level security policies from the Security Controller to an NSF. The 
Registration Interface is used to register the capabilities of an NSF with the 
Security Controller. The Monitoring Interface is used to collect monitoring 
data from an NSF.

The goal of I2NSF is to define a set of software interfaces and data models of 
such interfaces for configuring, maintaining, and monitoring *NSFs in cloud 
environments, including NFV and edge deployments*. For security management 
automation in an autonomous security system, I2NSF needs to have a feedback 
control loop consisting of security policy configuration in an NSF, monitoring 
for an NSF, data analysis for NSF monitoring data, feedback delivery, and 
security policy augmentation/generation. For this security management 
automation, the I2NSF framework requires a new component to collect NSF 
monitoring data and analyze them, which is called I2NSF Analyzer. Also, the 
I2NSF framework needs a new interface to deliver feedback messages for security 
policy adjustment from I2NSF Analyzer to Security Controller. *A proper 
translation of the planned actions onto NSF capabilities requires a 
well-defined model for representing these actions*.

I2NSF is vulnerable to inside and supply chain attacks since it trusts *NSF 
capability declarations as* provided by DMS, assuming that NSFs work 
*appropriately in all circumstances, as well as I2NSF User’s policy 
declarations and the actions of the Security Controller*. The registration of 
NSF capabilities, the *declaration* of a security policy from either the I2NSF 
User or *its enforcement by the* Security Controller, and the monitoring data 
from an NSF are assumed to be genuine and non-malicious. If one of such 
activities is malicious, the security system based on I2NSF may collapse. To 
prevent this malicious activity from happening in the I2NSF framework or detect 
the root of a security attack, all the activities in the I2NSF framework should 
be logged in either a centralized or decentralized (e.g., blockchain) way. 
Also, the *provenance and status* of the I2NSF components (i.e., I2NSF User, 
Security Controller, NSF, DMS, and I2NSF Analyzer) need to be verified by 
remote attestation, *leveraging the current results mostly focused on IT 
environments*.

Finally, the current YANG data models for the I2NSF interfaces *are designed on 
the basis of NSFs implemented as virtual machines, and therefore* they need to 
be redesigned for the case where I2NSF components are instantiated by 
containers.

The I2NSF working group's deliverables include:

o A single document for an extension of I2NSF framework for security management 
automation. This document will initially be produced for reference as a living 
list to track and record discussions: the working group may decide to not 
publish this document as an RFC.
o A YANG data model document for I2NSF Application Interface to deliver 
feedback from I2NSF Analyzer to Security Controller.
o A single document for applicability and use cases in I2NSF-based security 
management automation.
o A single document for security policy translator to support the mapping 
between a high-level YANG module and a low-level YANG module: the working group 
may decide to not publish this document as an RFC. *This document will apply 
the recommendations under discussion in NETMOD and OPSAWG on event modeling*.
o A single document for remote attestation for I2NSF components, *based on the 
work of the RATS WG*.
o A single document for I2NSF on *container deployments*.

Be goode

--
"Esta vez no fallaremos, Doctor Infierno"

Dr Diego R. Lopez
Telefonica I+D
https://www.linkedin.com/in/dr2lopez/

e-mail: diego.r.lo...@telefonica.com<mailto:diego.r.lo...@telefonica.com>
Mobile:  +34 682 051 091
----------------------------------

On 16/11/2020, 10:52, "Diego R. Lopez" 
<diego.r.lo...@telefonica.com<mailto:diego.r.lo...@telefonica.com>> wrote:

Hi,

The date does suit me reasonably. Thanks, Yoav!

I am not sure if I am counted as an author of the recharter proposal, but let 
me share with you a few suggested changes (highlighted in red and with asterisk 
around, in case you do not enjoy an HTML-enabled email reader:

Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) provides security *function* 
vendors *users, and operators* with a standard framework and interfaces for 
cloud-based security services. I2NSF enables the enforcement of a high-level 
security policy, *expressed according to a user's perspective of the target 
network*. This security policy enforcement in I2NSF is a data-driven approach 
using NETCONF/YANG or RESTCONF/YANG, where a security policy is constructed 
*based on a YANG data model*.

The I2NSF framework consists of four components such as I2NSF User, Security 
Controller, Network Security Function (NSF), and Developer's Management System 
(DMS). The 2NSF User specifies a high-level security policy for a target 
network. The Security Controller *is aware of the capabilities of the attached 
NSFs, using them to build the security service(s) satisfying the policy 
expressed by the I2NSF User*. An NSF *provides a set of* specific security 
*capabilities* (e.g., firewalling, web filtering, packet inspection, 
DDOS-attack mitigation…), *applying* security policy rules. The DMS registers 
the capabilities of an NSF with the Security Controller.

The I2NSF framework has four interfaces such as Consumer-Facing Interface, 
NSF-Facing Interface, Registration Interface, and Monitoring Interface. 
Consumer-Facing Interface is used to deliver high-level security policies from 
the I2NSF User to the Security Controller. NSF-Facing Interface is used to 
deliver low-level security policies from the Security Controller to an NSF. The 
Registration Interface is used to register the capabilities of an NSF with the 
Security Controller. The Monitoring Interface is used to collect monitoring 
data from an NSF.

The goal of I2NSF is to define a set of software interfaces and data models of 
such interfaces for configuring, maintaining, and monitoring *NSFs in cloud 
environments, including NFV and edge deployments*. For security management 
automation in an autonomous security system, I2NSF needs to have a feedback 
control loop consisting of security policy configuration in an NSF, monitoring 
for an NSF, data analysis for NSF monitoring data, feedback delivery, and 
security policy augmentation/generation. For this security management 
automation, the I2NSF framework requires a new component to collect NSF 
monitoring data and analyze them, which is called I2NSF Analyzer. Also, the 
I2NSF framework needs a new interface to deliver feedback messages for security 
policy adjustment from I2NSF Analyzer to Security Controller.

I2NSF is vulnerable to inside and supply chain attacks since it trusts *NSF 
capability declarations as* provided by DMS, assuming that NSFs work 
*appropriately in all circumstances, as well as I2NSF User’s policy 
declarations and the actions of the Security Controller*. The registration of 
NSF capabilities, the *declaration* of a security policy from either the I2NSF 
User or *its enforcement by the* Security Controller, and the monitoring data 
from an NSF are assumed to be genuine and non-malicious. If one of such 
activities is malicious, the security system based on I2NSF may collapse. To 
prevent this malicious activity from happening in the I2NSF framework or detect 
the root of a security attack, all the activities in the I2NSF framework should 
be logged in either a centralized or decentralized (e.g., blockchain) way. 
Also, the *provenance and status* of the I2NSF components (i.e., I2NSF User, 
Security Controller, NSF, DMS, and I2NSF Analyzer) need to be verified by 
remote attestation.

Finally, the current YANG data models for the I2NSF interfaces *are designed on 
the basis of NSFs implemented as virtual machines, and therefore* they need to 
be redesigned for the case where I2NSF components are instantiated by 
containers.

The I2NSF working group's deliverables include:

o A single document for an extension of I2NSF framework for security management 
automation. This document will initially be produced for reference as a living 
list to track and record discussions: the working group may decide to not 
publish this document as an RFC.
o A YANG data model document for I2NSF Application Interface to deliver 
feedback from I2NSF Analyzer to Security Controller.
o A single document for applicability and use cases in I2NSF-based security 
management automation.
o A single document for security policy translator to support the mapping 
between a high-level YANG module and a low-level YANG module: the working group 
may decide to not publish this document as an RFC.
o A single document for remote attestation for I2NSF components.
o A single document for I2NSF in *container deployments*.

Be goode,

--
"Esta vez no fallaremos, Doctor Infierno"

Dr Diego R. Lopez
Telefonica I+D
https://www.linkedin.com/in/dr2lopez/

e-mail: diego.r.lo...@telefonica.com<mailto:diego.r.lo...@telefonica.com>
Mobile:  +34 682 051 091
----------------------------------

On 16/11/2020, 08:07, "Yoav Nir" 
<ynir.i...@gmail.com<mailto:ynir.i...@gmail.com>> wrote:

Does Thursday, December 3rd at 14:00 UTC work for everyone?

It’s 16:00 for me, 15:00 for much of Europe, 9:00 AM EST, 6:00 AM PST, and 
unfortunately, 23:00 in Seoul.

I’ll wait 24 hours before scheduling the meeting in case there are objections.

Yoav




On 16 Nov 2020, at 3:44, Mr. Jaehoon Paul Jeong 
<jaehoon.p...@gmail.com<mailto:jaehoon.p...@gmail.com>> wrote:

Hi Yoav,
I agree that we can schedule our online interim meeting on the week of the 29th 
/ first week of December.

Could you schedule such an interim meeting?

I believe that we can get more people to be engaged in the new I2NSF work items
other than the authors of the current I2NSF WG and individual drafts.
With those people, I hope our I2NSF WG can have more energy. :)

Thanks.

Best Regards,
Paul

On Mon, Nov 16, 2020 at 1:59 AM Yoav Nir 
<ynir.i...@gmail.com<mailto:ynir.i...@gmail.com>> wrote:
Hi, Paul

As Roman said in a separate email message, we can’t schedule a meeting during 
IETF week. It also requires two weeks notice, so it anyway can only be done on 
the week of the 29th / first week of December.

That’s not a bad thing: it will give people enough time to read the charter and 
form an opinion before coming to the meeting.

If and when we have this meeting, I think we need to get a good number (5 
maybe?) or people who are not authors and will commit to reviewing the proposed 
documents. I think it is very obvious that this working group has lost energy, 
and we wouldn’t want to take on more work unless there is a clear indication 
that there will be such energy going forward.

Yoav



On 15 Nov 2020, at 18:26, Mr. Jaehoon Paul Jeong 
<jaehoon.p...@gmail.com<mailto:jaehoon.p...@gmail.com>> wrote:

Hi Linda and Yoav,
Here is the text for I2NSF WG Re-chartering.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Charter for Working Group

Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) provides security vendors with 
a standard framework and interfaces for cloud-based security services. I2NSF 
enables the enforcement of a high-level security policy of a user's perspective 
in a target network (e.g., cloud network and edge network). This security 
policy enforcement in I2NSF is a data-driven approach using NETCONF/YANG or 
RESTCONF/YANG where a security policy is constructed into an XML file based on 
a YANG data model.

The I2NSF framework consists of four components such as I2NSF User, Security 
Controller, Network Security Function (NSF), and Developer's Management System 
(DMS). I2NSF User specifies a high-level security policy for a target network 
(e.g., cloud network). Security Controller maintains the capability of an NSF 
and takes a security policy from I2NSF User for the enforcement of the 
corresponding security service. An NSF performs a specific security service 
(e.g., firewall, web filter, deep packet inspection, and DDOS-attack mitigator) 
according to a security policy rule. DMS registers the capability of an NSF 
with Security Controller.

The I2NSF framework has four interfaces such as Consumer-Facing Interface, 
NSF-Facing Interface, Registration Interface, and Monitoring Interface. 
Consumer-Facing Interface is used to deliver a high-level security policy from 
I2NSF User to Security Controller. NSF-Facing Interface is used to deliver a 
low-level security policy from Security Controller to an NSF. Registration 
Interface is used to register the capability of an NSF with Security 
Controller. Monitoring Interface is used to collect monitoring data from an NSF.

The goal of I2NSF is to define a set of software interfaces and data models of 
such interfaces for configuring, maintaining, and monitoring NSFs in Network 
Functions Virtualization (NFV) environments. For security management automation 
in an autonomous security system, I2NSF needs to have a feedback control loop 
consisting of security policy configuration in an NSF, monitoring for an NSF, 
data analysis for NSF monitoring data, feedback delivery, and security policy 
augmentation/generation. For this security management automation, the I2NSF 
framework requires a new component to collect NSF monitoring data and analyze 
them, which is called I2NSF Analyzer. Also, the I2NSF framework needs a new 
interface to deliver a feedback message for security policy adjustment from 
I2NSF Analyzer to Security Controller.

I2NSF is vulnerable to an inside attack and a supply chain attack since it 
trusts in NSFs provided by DMS, assuming that NSFs work for their security 
services appropriately. Also, I2NSF trusts in I2NSF User and Security 
Controller. The registration of an NSF's capability, the enforcement of a 
security policy from either I2NSF User or Security Controller, and the 
monitoring data from an NSF are assumed to be genuine and non-malicious. If one 
of such activities is malicious, the security system based on I2NSF may 
collapse. To prevent this malicious activity from happening in the I2NSF 
framework or detect the root of a security attack, all the activities in the 
I2NSF framework should be logged in either a centralized way or a decentralized 
way (e.g., blockchain). Also, the operations and activities of the I2NSF 
components (i.e., I2NSF User, Security Controller, NSF, DMS, and I2NSF 
Analyzer) need to be verified by remote attestation.

Furthermore, an NSF can be instantiated as either a Virtual Network Function 
(VNF) in an NFV-based cloud or a container in a native cloud. The current YANG 
data models for the I2NSF interfaces are designed on the basis of VNF, so they 
need to be redesigned for the case where I2NSF components are instantiated by 
containers.

The I2NSF working group's deliverables include:

o A single document for an extension of I2NSF framework for security management 
automation. This document will initially be produced for reference as a living 
list to track and record discussions: the working group may decide to not 
publish this document as an RFC.
o A YANG data model document for I2NSF Application Interface to deliver 
feedback from I2NSF Analyzer to Security Controller.
o A single document for applicability and use cases in I2NSF-based security 
management automation.
o A single document for security policy translator to support the mapping 
between a high-level YANG module and a low-level YANG module: the working group 
may decide to not publish this document as an RFC.
o A single document for remote attestation for I2NSF components.
o A single document for I2NSF in Cloud Native NFV Architecture.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Linda,
Could you schedule our online meeting to discuss this re-chartering text this 
IETF-109 week?

Thanks.

Best Regards,
Paul
--
===========================
Mr. Jaehoon (Paul) Jeong, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Sungkyunkwan University
Office: +82-31-299-4957
Email: jaehoon.p...@gmail.com<mailto:jaehoon.p...@gmail.com>, 
paulje...@skku.edu<mailto:paulje...@skku.edu>
Personal Homepage: 
http://iotlab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php<http://cpslab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php>



--
===========================
Mr. Jaehoon (Paul) Jeong, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Sungkyunkwan University
Office: +82-31-299-4957
Email: jaehoon.p...@gmail.com<mailto:jaehoon.p...@gmail.com>, 
paulje...@skku.edu<mailto:paulje...@skku.edu>
Personal Homepage: 
http://iotlab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php<http://cpslab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php>


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