Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for draft-ietf-i2rs-problem-statement-10: No Objection
When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this introductory paragraph, however.) Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-i2rs-problem-statement/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMENT: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- - section 1: "different vendors' routing systems" seems like it's assuming that there is only one vendor involved in each box. I don't think that's consistent with what's behind i2rs so re-wording there might be better. - figure 1: I'm sure you'll fix the page break - confidentiality for i2rs protocol: if I can watch i2rs traffic I can probably infer what policies are being used and use that to better attack networks. I think you could easily strengthen the wording there and that'd be better. If one has a way to securely authenticate endpoints, then you can almost as easily ensure confidentiality. - general question: We know that govts target network admins. What are we doing to make i2rs traffic less easily used as a selector? (e.g. make sure it could work over Tor?) - the secdir review [1] called out some nits you may want to consider (if you did already thanks, I didn't check in detail) [1] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/secdir/current/msg06342.html _______________________________________________ i2rs mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/i2rs
