---------------------------------------<snip>-------------------------------
Considering the circumstances of a disaster, it wouldn't amaze me. In
1969, the Canadian government started forcing all financial
institutions, over a certain size, to implement a DR plan, and test it.
-----------------------------------<unsnip>--------------------------------
From my experience in the "Chicago Flood" of 1992, I can just about
guarantee that you won't think of everything. Consider these things:
basic office supplies, housing and feeding essential staff, making sure
that the DR equipment can handle the workload, communications
switchover, transition back to the "home site" when it's over, dealing
with customer concerns with limited/altered communication routes and
coordination of (necessary?) software updates. We were forced to add
mainframe storage, because our paging rate exceeded 600 pages/minute. We
learned about extended channels because of the print load, because we
were heavily dependant on printed reports and couodn't move them fast
enough from the DR site to the users (we even tried chartered
helicopters!), and various mechanisms for data entry, from the Chicago
Board of Trade trading floor. We tested quarterly and still learned a
LOT when the disaster actually struck.
My take: much of the plan must be dependant on suppliers' willingness
and ability to respond quickly, with good answers to problems
encountered and timely solutions.
Where do you draw the line between probable problems, possible problems
and highly unlikely problems?
Rick
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