I also wanted to voice strong support for this initiative. One of the key goals <https://notes.ietf.org/YGynIPpYS7yqg5G7ZeSQeA> of this work is to authenticate messages that go through mailing lists that may modify the messages e.g. adding subject prefixes or footers to the body. The proposal on "message algebra <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-gondwana-dkim2-modification-alegbra-00>" is a significant step forward in authenticating mailing list message flows that currently cause difficulties for other authentication efforts at the IETF i.e. DMARCbis. This work also provides strong protections <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-gondwana-dkim2-motivation-01> from replay attacks whereby the signed recipient must match the envelope recipient. This has the potential to reverse the trend I see where the existing replay protections come at the expense of deliverability of forwarded messages (or increased support volume). I hope the IETF recognizes these important improvements and supports restarting a WG for email authentication. -Wei
On Wed, Nov 6, 2024 at 6:09 PM Richard Clayton <[email protected]> wrote: > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > In message <[email protected]>, Bron > Gondwana <[email protected]> writes > > > I prepared presentations about DKIM2 for two places at IETF121 - > > ALLDISPATCH and MAILMAINT. Slides are here: > > > > ALLDISPATCH: > > > https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/121/materials/slides-121-alldispatch-dkim2-00 > > MAILMAINT: > > > https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/121/materials/slides-121-mailmaint-dkim2-00 > > and the current outline design is at > > <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gondwana-dkim2-motivation/> > > please note the authors > > > we believe we have a design that's > > ready to ask the IETF to re-open this work, and we can have > > confidence that there are people willing to do that work. The > > group is composed of engineers who will implement and test this > > proposal, and who have promised to come over here and engage in the > > IETF process. > > yes indeed -- we are keen to see (rough) consensus improvements to our > design, though we are also very much invested in having running code at > (in my case) Yahoo which will allow to understand as early as possible > how the new scheme operates at scale. > > ... and it's not just the engineers. My "product management" people can > also see the advantages of using DKIM2. We look forward to the IETF > addressing the bureaucracy and getting things running. > > > We have a draft charter here: > > https://notes.ietf.org/YGynIPpYS7yqg5G7ZeSQeA > > - -- > richard Richard Clayton > > Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a Benjamin > little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. Franklin > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1 > > iQA/AwUBZywg3t2nQQHFxEViEQLLQACdEt+R/WjJtB/3sANdYB1pugmb9ScAnj49 > ix2UkeQwLo7r19pU+M4fdUYc > =viLT > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > _______________________________________________ > Ietf-dkim mailing list -- [email protected] > To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >
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