Don't these try to describe different things? I agree that senders can provide the "donotmodify and donotexplode flags" to help forwarders and receivers understand the safety requirements for a given message. This is useful when the sender is willing to trade deliverability for safety. Forwarders can apply these flags when they might modify or expand mailing lists. I was describing the implications of a DKIM2 pass which does not say anything about safety. Instead I was trying to say that someday a safety validation such as DMARC, could be built using DKIM2, though that linkage between DMARC and DKIM2 does not exist today. -Wei
On Mon, Aug 10, 2026 at 11:46 AM John Levine <[email protected]> wrote: > It appears that Wei Chuang <[email protected]> said: > >To me a DKIM2 pass indicates that all changes are identifiable to some > >responsible signature signer, which I think it does. That said, there > >could be other more stringent verification criteria that build upon a > DKIM2 > >verification result, much like a "DMARC pass" builds upon DKIM1 and SPF > >results, that could be evaluated and reported. These might have the > safety > >properties you're thinking of. > > To be a wee bit repetitive, what about the donotmodify and donotexplode > flags? > > R's, > John >
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