Hello Bron,
Allen Robinson stated on this list that null recipes "reintroduce the
concept of trust to DKIM2" and cited this as a strong reason not to
support them. Your description ("switches from evidence based to trust
me") confirms his assessment. The mechanism the specification relies on
for antivirus, DLP and encryption gateways is, by its authors' own
acknowledgment, a reversion to the trust model DKIM2 was designed to
replace.
Regards,
Vittorio Moccia
Il 2026-09-08 15:11 Bron Gondwana ha scritto:
On Tue, Sep 8, 2026, at 17:47, Vittorio wrote:
On malware I agreed, the libraries aren't the exposure. But I still
haven't seen how a body recipe avoids carrying downstream exactly
what
an antivirus gateway stripped. Antivirus usually operates at the
edge,
but the same edge serves both local reception and onward relay to
other
systems.
This is what the null body recipe is for. It is canonically
impossible to both suppress the data the antivirus gateway stripped
AND make it possible to recreate the previous message in a way that
the hash of an earlier Message-Instance header will still match.
The alternative, as ARC has demonstrated, is a trust-based system
rather than an evidence based system. The null body recipe is just
that, a way that switches from evidence based to "trust me".
Bron.
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