I've posted a https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-dns/02/
to remove LWSP, and fix the digital signature algorithms to match spec
-07.  Language clarifies the key type names to digital signature
algorithm names.
-Wei

On Mon, Oct 19, 2026 at 8:52 AM Richard Clayton <[email protected]>
wrote:

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> In message <[email protected]>, Mauro De
> Gennaro <[email protected]> writes
>
> >Two editorial points on how the two drafts fit together, which I ran into
> while
> >updating mail-auth to draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-spec-07:
> >
> >- -07 still cites draft-chuang-dkim2-dns-04 as [DKIMKEYS]. That draft has
> been
> >replaced by draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-dns and does not define the new key
> type, so
> >the reference should point to draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-dns.
>
> Yes it should, I'll fix that in -08
>
> >- Section 3 of -07 says "Verifiers MUST implement all five algorithms",
> while
> >Section 3.3 of dns-01 says Signers and Verifiers "SHOULD implement
> >ed25519-sha256 and mldsa44-ed25519-sha512". Whatever the final list of
> >algorithms is, the two drafts should say the same thing.
>
> As I noted earlier there are numerous inconsistencies even just in the
> spec-07 document alone. We have an interim meeting on Wednesday (and a
> mailing list 24x7 !!) and I will issue an -08 to fix those
> inconsistencies once I have some guidance which way the WG wishes to
> move ...
>
> ... also, mldsa44 is one of those algorithms where you don't need to
> hash (and it is kind of discouraged). That is if we don't use hybrids
> then our list could be
>
>         rsa-sha256              key name rsa
>         rsa-sha512              key name rsa
>         ed25519-sha256          key name ed25519
>         ed25519-sha512          key name ed25519
>         mdlsa44                 key name mdlsa44
>
> and we could drop the sha512 variants if no-one was interested.
>
> My preference remains to AND signature results and not use hybrids (and
> to use mdlsa44 rather than hashmldsa44)  [and to change PQ algorithm at
> or before AUTH48 if we've gone down the wrong track]
>
> BTW, the section on MLDSA-44 in spec-07 almost certainly needs updating
> to point at the LAMPS document  -- which is with the RFC editor so it
> will be an RFC RSN.  They use the term "composite" rather than "hybrid".
>
> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs/>
>
> Having read this rather more carefully than I did before I find that
> they require a little bit more than just gluing keys and outputs
> together, but it still does not look like "building your own crypto" to
> me and a shim that packages the mechanisms here and then calls your
> favourite crypto library looks pretty simple (Bron's Claude will
> probably have finished doing that by the time I finish this sentence...)
>
> - --
> richard @ highwayman . com                       "Nothing seems the same
>                           Still you never see the change from day to day
>                                 And no-one notices the customs slip away"
>
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