It seems to me that the domains likely to benefit from the ability to state "All email we send is DKIM signed" share a few things in common.
1. They're concerned about other people sending email claiming to be "from" the domain. 2. They send email using the domain to, typically, a large number of B2C recipients (excluding the null assertion "we send no email", which can be handled in other ways) 3. All the email they send is DKIM signed. 4. They primarily care about mail appearing to be "from" their domain being sent to users who also legitimately receive real email from them. It also seems that the number of domains who want this will likely be a small fraction of the total number of domains, and likely a small fraction of the number of emails sent. The combination of 2, 3 and 4 means that any receiving ISP that receives "forged" email that the domain cares about will also receive legitimate email from that domain. If there were another field in the DKIM-Signature header, or an entirely separate email header covered by the DKIM signature, that stated "all email sent using this domain in the From field will be DKIM signed" then any receiving MTA or MTA cluster could keep track of that state (probably using their existing reputation tracking system in the case of large receivers, and using a fairly trivial extension to their DKIM plugins in the case of smaller ones). That would provide all the benefit of ADSP to senders who want it, without adding a per-email latency overhead for receivers who want to support it, at the cost of a keeping a fairly small amount of state at the receiving MTA. (Other information could be communicated in-band in the same way - including "we're no longer dkim signing every email sent"). Did we already look at this idea and discard it before we settled on using a DNS query for every email received? Cheers, Steve _______________________________________________ NOTE WELL: This list operates according to http://mipassoc.org/dkim/ietf-list-rules.html