> Chaining signatures with Authentication-Results is unlikely to work, > since with two or more levels of chaining, there is no reliable way to > tell which A-R header goes with which signature.
Chaining isn't the point. And mailing lists aren't the only forwarders (I agree with what you say about mailing lists). My address, at computer.org, is a forwarder. When the mail gets to my real mail server, it doesn't filter based on computer.org, but based on the original sender, of course. Now, computer.org won't break any DKIM sig that's already there, so there's no worry. But suppose it did. The model is this: If you're going to send a message on and are not going to break the signature, you do one of these: 1. do nothing to A-R or DKIM-Sig records that are there, and do not sign yourself, OR 2. do nothing to A-R or DKIM-Sig records that are there, and add your own sig. Your sig does NOT cover A-R. If you're going to send a message on and ARE going to break the signature, you do this: 1. verify all previous sigs, creating your own A-R in the process, then 2. remove all previous sigs AND all previous A-R, then 3. put in your own A-R, then 4. DKIM-sign the message, having the sig cover your A-R. If the process works like that, the verifier has exactly one signature that covers the authentication results, so it knows where they came from. It can use that extra information or not, as it chooses. We can argue about whether the information is useful in that case, but it's the verifier's choice. And it means that you don't leave signatures around that YOU broke, so if I get "one good signature and a bunch of broken signatures", it means the signatures were broken for some other reason. (I probably don't care about that, I'm just saying....) > A-R can be useful in some very narrow circumstances, where the channel > between the agent that applies the header and the agent that uses it > is secure. The most likely setup is that it's applied as the message > is dropped into a mailbox on a server, and it's used by a MUA or local > filtering proxy that picks up the message via POP or IMAP. As I describe things above, A-R can be useful in more situations than that. If you (the verifier, the MUA, whatever) trusts the signer that signed the A-R, you have information you can use. Barry, as participant _______________________________________________ NOTE WELL: This list operates according to http://mipassoc.org/dkim/ietf-list-rules.html