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On 12/18/13 8:17 AM, S Moonesamy wrote:
>> 
>> I suppose, to avoid confusion, it probably is better to use the 
>> definition portion of it instead of the defined word in the
>> usual conversation.
> 
> There has been some discussion on other IETF mailing lists about
> the definition of the word "privacy".  Warren and Brandeis are
> often cited in a U.S context.  The "right of personal immunity" is
> broader than privacy.
> 
> Within an IETF context it might be a problem if the "right to be
> let alone" is used.  In my opinion a right is guaranteed by law and
> that doesn't fit in with what the IETF does.

Many of us from academia (in my case, having recently jumped ship for
civil society) that study privacy are more persuaded by Helen
Nissenbaum's notion of privacy as "contextual integrity". Here's the
skiny in shorter-than-book-length form:

"I give an account of privacy in terms of expected flows of personal
information, modeled with the construct of context-relative
informational norms. The key parameters of informational norms are
actors (subject, sender, recipient), attributes (types of
information), and transmission principles (constraints under which
information flows). Generally, when the flow of information adheres to
entrenched norms, all is well; violations of these norms, however,
often result in protest and complaint. In a health care context, for
example, patients expect their physicians to keep personal medical
information con½dential, yet they accept that it might be shared with
specialists as needed. Patients’ expectations would be breached and
they would likely be shocked and dismayed if they learned that their
physicians had sold the information to a marketing company. In this
event, we would say that informational norms for the health care
context had been violated." [1]

Much of the scholarship these days in privacy thinking is increasingly
based on this kind of contextual definition of privacy (and in the
U.S., at least, the Obama administration embraced this in a recasting
of fair information principles in their Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights).

At CDT, we argue that "abuse" or "harm" is an anemic framing, and that
there are important privacy interests implicated after information has
been fixed and collected but before any use has been made. See
Brookman and Hans [2], if you're interested in reading more.

[1]: http://www.amacad.org/publications/daedalus/11_fall_nissenbaum.pdf
[2]:
http://www.futureofprivacy.org/wp-content/uploads/Brookman-Why-Collection-Matters.pdf

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Joseph Lorenzo Hall
Chief Technologist
Center for Democracy & Technology
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