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On 12/18/13 8:17 AM, S Moonesamy wrote: >> >> I suppose, to avoid confusion, it probably is better to use the >> definition portion of it instead of the defined word in the >> usual conversation. > > There has been some discussion on other IETF mailing lists about > the definition of the word "privacy". Warren and Brandeis are > often cited in a U.S context. The "right of personal immunity" is > broader than privacy. > > Within an IETF context it might be a problem if the "right to be > let alone" is used. In my opinion a right is guaranteed by law and > that doesn't fit in with what the IETF does. Many of us from academia (in my case, having recently jumped ship for civil society) that study privacy are more persuaded by Helen Nissenbaum's notion of privacy as "contextual integrity". Here's the skiny in shorter-than-book-length form: "I give an account of privacy in terms of expected flows of personal information, modeled with the construct of context-relative informational norms. The key parameters of informational norms are actors (subject, sender, recipient), attributes (types of information), and transmission principles (constraints under which information flows). Generally, when the flow of information adheres to entrenched norms, all is well; violations of these norms, however, often result in protest and complaint. In a health care context, for example, patients expect their physicians to keep personal medical information con½dential, yet they accept that it might be shared with specialists as needed. Patients’ expectations would be breached and they would likely be shocked and dismayed if they learned that their physicians had sold the information to a marketing company. In this event, we would say that informational norms for the health care context had been violated." [1] Much of the scholarship these days in privacy thinking is increasingly based on this kind of contextual definition of privacy (and in the U.S., at least, the Obama administration embraced this in a recasting of fair information principles in their Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights). At CDT, we argue that "abuse" or "harm" is an anemic framing, and that there are important privacy interests implicated after information has been fixed and collected but before any use has been made. See Brookman and Hans [2], if you're interested in reading more. [1]: http://www.amacad.org/publications/daedalus/11_fall_nissenbaum.pdf [2]: http://www.futureofprivacy.org/wp-content/uploads/Brookman-Why-Collection-Matters.pdf - -- Joseph Lorenzo Hall Chief Technologist Center for Democracy & Technology 1634 I ST NW STE 1100 Washington DC 20006-4011 (p) 202-407-8825 (f) 202-637-0968 j...@cdt.org PGP: https://josephhall.org/gpg-key fingerprint: 3CA2 8D7B 9F6D DBD3 4B10 1607 5F86 6987 40A9 A871 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.13 (Darwin) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJSsbiPAAoJEF+GaYdAqahxrI4QAIuv0oLj2ypQ5lTQ99FlFz+w /V5/LCOIkV0ELJneEKJYvttZFI86bl2d2ZnZ6OH58PjFRing3/cuUAlF2aqnlRey wQnkRqijU9ULhH0sGfTXHhjlR4nHvBi6OWV8GramG9GYOZHQZObCFEyeK7UIUmuT w4whhXmCe9r78b03BoFab8QWi0bZNt6HWD7ln5MQcHk3ERX/1qg0PzqjAaLiSIDV TyoVp5cUUf9SdyA6xijQ1GRswgGUHFj62GkJ5bGX6bJhUAYbgGmdHkuYqhsumI+6 lE7+3OT5vqOl9i4iqXLXlXnilqGo6lxTf9i3uSrDtfPSNKbIQIJcQokY+rsPjQqR zS6rZ779RG0vrff/rVombLYvQE+NuQricUt2QqiFdQmVG7gZyyjupt/on7uJjjxU QSYDXYVk8hnKZJqxnlNWTOyDiRrIl25lFx47vVitD2X4oactxrIdF2bpIzvdqFoE g41cooUAIWWn5J6ZpwtuhlQj3ML8kwZqk1+Iv8vJkp6z5vRtwiScrMNSN+82TGA9 KbB87KHzCVeUoDDpHGwUyLnefSj9LXhAGuEtEacJ9KMygCjGTjeKnRulCjOXBJ5Z fEDC0KJd63PJml+kGCcabozP5NB25tMHScMY+1PoGny908IA+PmuSY2XChLLf5Fg f4pqNw75JypzxD7jX7Z7 =6UgP -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ ietf-privacy mailing list ietf-privacy@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-privacy