Dean Anderson wrote: > > On Tue, 16 Mar 2004, Dr. Jeffrey Race wrote: > > > > The whole point is there are NO TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS and never will be. > > Correct, and I gave an explanation for this in inforamtion theory.
What information theory says is that the probability of detecting spam is less than 100%. This has nothing to do with what or what not the IETF can do to prevent spam. This result is useful only for an end-user, to feel good about his spam filter not being 100% effective. This is a user result, not an IETF goal. What interests the IETF are technical spam solutions, for example, that would prevent email that comes from unidentifiable or rogue senders/MTAs to be ever received. Not because spam is detected as such but because untrusted, unidentifiable or rogue senders/MTAs are detected. Yeah, this would still leave room for trusted and identifiable senders/MTAs to send spam messages. But such spammers are no longer a hidden target. And it would be a lot harder for someone to send spam on behalf of you. These are examples of feasible technical, IETF-relevant solutions to spam, not at all denied by information theory. To implement these solutions, we need an Internet design where we recognize that the end points have become much less trusted than the connection. This is the opposite of what the DARPA Internet assumed and was designed for. So, some things gotta change. For example, saying that you're "[EMAIL PROTECTED]" should not be so easy to do when you're sending email, even though it should still be easy to set "[EMAIL PROTECTED]" as your address in your MUA. Cheers, Ed Gerck
