Hi Bernard,
Regarding client authentication, there are a number of constraints on the solution that lead to the current choice. The most relevant constraint is that there may be no prior relationship between LIS (network operator) and device. In designing for arbitrary access networks, this constraint was considered important. This prevents use of pre-shared keys such as would be required for digest/basic [1] [2]. Thus we come to the choice of IP address and return reachability. I believe that the draft addresses the impact of this choice adequately; Section 9.3 seems most directly applicable here, but other places touch on this choice where it’s relevant. If you do not believe that there are relevant points that are not brought up, I’d encourage you to send text. Regarding alternative identifiers, there is an extension document that talks about use of alternative identifiers, and I do believe that this particular point CAN be addressed in an extension. For those, authentication (other than return reachability, if you consider that to be a form of authentication) can be made a requirement. I’ll address the other more substantive point regarding identity in PIDF-LO in another (longer) mail. --Martin [1] The document is clear on its use of digest/basic: the LIS MUST NOT rely on it being used. That’s in recognition of the above constraint. In other words, the LIS MUST NOT fail a request because the device did not provide authentication. That doesn’t prevent it from being used in an extension to the protocol. [2] Of course, there are networks where the constraint might not be applicable. For instance, access to the network could be restricted using some form of authentication. However, a device that accesses a LIS within those networks must also be aware that it needs to present this same authentication information when talking to a LIS. We cannot guarantee that a device will do this, since compliance would need to be a prerequisite of network access; designers of future access networks might choose to add this to their network design. From: Bernard Aboba Sent: Tuesday, 9 June 2009 5:48 AM To: b...@estacado.net; ietf@ietf.org Subject: Re: Gen-ART LC Review ofdraft-ietf-geopriv-http-location-delivery-14.txt Mary Barnes said: "It doesn't explicitly "forbid" the use of digest authn, but if it can't depend on client support, then it can't really base any decision on it." The question isn't just about an authorization decision. There is also the issue about what the LIS is supposed to do with client authentication information if it is provided. How is this information reflected in the PIDF-LO that is returned in a HELD response? Ben Campbell said: "The part I was trying to highlight was the lack of client device authentication, not LIS authentication. If I read 9.1 right, it only covers authentication of the LIS. I assume there is no expectation that client devices present TLS certs to the LIS, right?" There are multiple potential identities that a device (and a user of that device) could assert and authenticate against. Currently the document only talks about use of the IP address as an identity, and says little about authentication. However, the PIDF-LO objects that are returned in HELD responses contain multiple identification fields. Currently the document says very little about how these fields are filled in. That leaves the protocol under-specified. Issues of protocol behavior that are this basic shouldn't be left to an "extensions" document. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ This message is for the designated recipient only and may contain privileged, proprietary, or otherwise private information. If you have received it in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete the original. Any unauthorized use of this email is prohibited. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ [mf2]
_______________________________________________ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf