--On Tuesday, September 01, 2009 18:06 -0400 Leslie Daigle <les...@thinkingcat.com> wrote:
> > I'm having troubles reconciling a couple of things: > > 1/ Recent discussion (different draft) on the importance of > the IAOC implementing IETF (and IAB) policy and admin > requirements; not having the IAOC *setting* those requirements; > > 2/ Suggesting that the IAB & IETF Chairs should not be on the > IAOC. Leslie, Let me try a little different perspective on this because I see both different issues and a more complex set of tradeoffs than your note implies. First and most important, the draft doesn't say "the IETF and IAB Chairs cannot serve on the IAOC". It eliminates that function as a _requirement_ of their roles. If the people holding those positions, in conjunction, respectively, with the IESG or IAB conclude that the Chairs have the time to do the job well and are, in your words, "in a unique position...", then nothing prevents them from _deciding_ to preserve the status quo. The problem is that we are turning those roles into full time (or more) jobs. I believe the IETF Chair role has already passed that point and that the IAB Chair one is rapidly moving in that direction. That is not, IMO, healthy for the IETF because, while we may get lucky sometimes, in general people who can take on full-time-or-more, IETF-uncompensated, IETF roles are different from those of us who need to perform "day jobs" while doing IETF work in whatever fractional time, or spare time, is available. Requiring that the roles be full time reduces the number of possible candidates, which reduces Nomcom choices, etc. It also tends to reinforce all of the trends that lead to isolation of the IESG and IAOC from the community (I'll avoid explaining that hypothesis at length unless it becomes necessary). And the document explicitly allows the IAB and/or IETF Chair to sit in on IAOC meetings and teleconferences if (i) the IAB or IESG decide to appoint someone else to the more permanent positions (people who are expected to participate actively and consistently) and (ii) the relevant Chair decides, possibly on the advice of other IAOC members but without any requirement for IAOC consensus agreement, that attendance when a specific matter is being discussed is important. So the only differences between what you are arguing and what the document suggests are: -- You apparently think that the participation in the IAOC and Trustees of the two Chairs is so important --always-- that, if time is limited, they need to put those responsibilities ahead of everything else. The document proposes to let the individuals involved and the bodies on which they serve make that decision in a way that best serves the community and to review it as they deem necessary. -- While I certainly agree that there are some issues that will come before the IAOC and/or Trustees in which the direct involvement of one or both Chairs is important, I don't believe that is true of every discussion and every decision. Again, I think that decision should be left to the relevant individuals (who are free to look at IAOC or Trustee agendas and decide to sit in), to the relevant bodies, and to the IAOC (who can always specifically invite participation in a particular discussion), while your position effectively takes those decisions and turns them over to an organizing document. -- Conversely, some decisions and discussions of the IAOC and Trustees may involve topics for which the the IETF and IAB Chairs are neither particular qualified or particularly interested. Certainly Nomcoms are not considering in-depth financial planning skills or great experience with IPR issues (or interest in either) as primary considerations in selecting IETF Chairs or IAB members (and I would hope that they would continue to avoid doing that). Again, it seems to me to be better to let the incumbents in those roles sort out the tradeoffs and best choices with their respective bodies than to force a choice in the organizing documents. Having people in the IAOC and Trustee positions who want to do them and have the bandwidth to do so should strengthen those bodies (whether those people are the Chairs or not), rather than risking having a disinterested Chair serving because it a job that cannot be escaped. Finally, and I believe that the above arguments stand whether or not you believe this (and the choice is up to the IESG and IAB in any event), I have trouble accepting the "unique position" argument until we believe that those two people are serving on the IAOC/Trustees as individuals with no obligation to consult with the relevant bodies. I don't read BCP 101 as contemplating that and would find it extremely problematic if interpreted that way. If they are actually expected to represent the perspectives of the IAB and IESG, as I believe, then the Chairs aren't inherently more "uniquely" qualified than any other member of those bodies or, in principle, a non-member liaison who maintains a very close relationship. And, again, the goal of the document is to give the IAB and IESG those choices, rather than assuming that a single choice will be optimal every year and on every occasion. To your specific comments... > As it stands the IETF Chair is in a unique position to > understand all the requirements of the IETF community and IETF > administrative activities. There isn't someone else who can > step in: all other IESG members are tasked, as a primary > responsibility, with looking after their particular areas. And the IETF Chair was a full time job even before the IAOC came along. Whatever was taking up that time, I think one can equally argue from it that the IETF Chair is equally "fully tasked". The decision should be left up to the IESG on the basis of who has the time, skills, and interest. I predict that the choice will often fall on the Chair, but believe the decision should be left up to the IESG rather than being rigidly specified for all time based on, e.g., the above model of who has time and energy. > The IAB Chair similarly sits at the confluence of all the > issues hitting the IAB, and is specifically responsible for > tracking them so that they get addressed by the IAB. While > the IAB Chair can, in theory, delegate actions on particular > topics, it at least used to be the case that some tasks are > too tricky or unappealing to get other involvement(too admin, > not enough architectural content). And, even with successful > delegation of individual tasks, the IAB Chair retains the > perspective across all the activities -- technical, IANA, RFC > Editor, etc. Same comment above, only more so. > I'm not going to disagree that the jobs are heavily loaded, > and that it's a problem for the IETF that the organization > relies heavily on finding a solid candidate for each of these > complex positions. > > However, I think taking them off the IAOC is *not* the place > to start. It makes more sense to me to sort out the > organizational challenges (of the IESG/IETF, and of the IAB) > that cause overloading of these positions, and *then* see what > makes sense in terms of identifying IAOC participation. While I look forward to specific proposals from you in those areas, I want to stress that this proposal doesn't take anyone, in any role, off the IAOC or Trustees. It merely lets the IESG and IAB make decisions that are appropriate to the circumstances and cast of characters each time. > Pulling these positions off the IAOC would succeed in > weakening the IAOC, even as it increases the stress levels in > the positions as the respective Chairs try to figure out what > is going on with the administrative support for the balls they > are trying to keep moving. See above. If the IAOC members --whomever they might be-- are keeping the IAB and IESG adequately informed, your comment is, IMO, just wrong. If they are not, then we have other problems but the solution to those problems certainly cannot be to enable the Chairs to behave less like IETF participants and more like imperial powers. john _______________________________________________ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf