Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote: >> There is a big difference in real engineering (i.e. outside a >> university) between a solution that only addresses part of a problem >> and one that is 'useless'.
Perhaps, you don't recognize the fact that BGP routing is global. >> In observed attacks and in simulations, the IP-AS number attack is >> much more significant than the routing layer attack in most >> circumstances. I'm not sure what are the IP-AS attack and the routing layer attack and whether you are worrying about attacks today or year 3010. So, before continuing discussion, I think you should write a draft precisely defining problems including the attacks. The draft may be more than 100 pages long. It should be noted, however, that, it is likely that I point out the attacks are identical, if I have enough time to read everal lines of the draft. Note that: A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format-06.txt says: The primary purpose of the Internet IP Address and AS Number Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) system is to improve routing security. >> There are many security concerns that BGP security could address. The >> only concerns for which a BGP security solution is essential is to >> prevent Denial of Service attacks and to prevent hijacking of IPv4 >> space The point of previous discussion was that RPKI is useless for such prevention. Read the ML log. >> after exhaustion is reached. With A+P, it will be reached in year 3010 or later. Masataka Ohta _______________________________________________ Ietf mailing list Ietf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf