----- Original Message ----- From: "ssakane" <ssak...@cisco.com> To: "t.p." <daedu...@btconnect.com> Cc: <draft-sakane-dhc-dhcpv6-kdc-opt...@tools.ietf.org>; <sec...@ietf.org>; "ietf" <ietf@ietf.org> Sent: Friday, June 08, 2012 2:29 PM > Hi Tom, > > Some reviewers suggested me to just remove the figure and its description in > 4.1 because it has ambiguity. I think it would be better to leave the 1st > paragraph in section 4.1, and I should remove the rest. What do you think > about this idea ?
I would leave it in. The first paragraph on its own I would think underspecified and the rest of the section does cover a number of issues, issues that only occurred to me when I read the section carefully. As I said in my last post, I then found I had further issues - how long to wait, should a secure DHCP trump an insecure DNS? - which may be worth exploring in addition. I do think that this kind of pseudocode helps a lot of developers to understand the issues and would want a good reason to remove it; at the same time, others see it as an impurity that has no part in a Standards Track RFC. One option would be to remove it to an Appendix which implicitly makes it Informative and not Normative so it is there for those who would benefit from it but will not upset those who consider it out of place. But I would bounce this off the krb list to see what reaction you get. Tom Petch > Thanks, > Shoichi > > On 6/8/12 7:37 PM, "t.p." <daedu...@btconnect.com> wrote: > > > Just to make public what I have hinted at privately, I think that steps > > in section 4.1 may be somewhat underspecified. > > > > They give the logic a client, one which supports both DHCP and DNS, > > should > > follow in order to find a KDC, with DNS information being preferred. > > One scenario outlined in section 1 is of a user having entered userid > > and > > passphrase and waiting to be authenticated. The steps imply a number of > > timeouts in succession without specifying what balance to take of how > > long > > to wait for a server to respond versus how long to keep the user > > waiting. > > I would find it difficult to know what balance to strike without > > guidance. > > > > A related issue is that section 4.1 prefers DNS to DHCP for Kerberos > > information but the Security Considerations stress the weakness of > > DHCP and recommend authenticating DHCP. What if DHCP is secure > > and DNS is not? Should DNS still be preferred? > > > > Tom Petch > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > From: "Jeffrey Hutzelman" <jh...@cmu.edu> > > To: "Samuel Weiler" <weiler+sec...@watson.org> > > Cc: <draft-sakane-dhc-dhcpv6-kdc-opt...@tools.ietf.org>; > > <sec...@ietf.org>; <ietf@ietf.org>; <jh...@cmu.edu> > > Sent: Thursday, May 24, 2012 6:50 PM > > Subject: Re: [secdir] secdir review of > > draft-sakane-dhc-dhcpv6-kdc-option > > > > > > > >
