On Oct 9, 2013, at 1:59 PM, Joe Abley <jab...@hopcount.ca> wrote:
> DNSSEC validation imposes a requirement for clock sync (to the accuracy 
> reasonably required to consider signature inception and expiry times). There 
> is a possible future in which such validation takes place on end hosts, 
> rather than intermediate resolvers. (We may wind up somewhere else, but there 
> are certainly people who think that is the Right Way).

Sure.   Including me.

> In that sense any device that needs to look up names in the DNS has a 
> potential requirement for time sync.

Yes, definitely.

> Of course even the wall clock you imagine might have a vendor who is capable 
> of running their own array of time servers as (e.g.) Apple does, but it seems 
> reasonable to imagine that there will be people who are not in that position, 
> and since I agree with you when you say:
> 
>> Of course, if a CPE vendor were to hard-code the FQDN of an NTP server 
>> belonging to someone else into their devices, that would be disastrous.
> 
> it seems to me that there's a plausible use case for a DHCP client to receive 
> direction on what servers to chime against.

Yup.   There's an equally plausible use case for distributing DNSSEC root keys 
using DHCP, so that the DHCP client has a current copy of the keys.   This 
totally solves the key rollover problem!

:)

Of course, the situations are not precisely analogous, but the point is that 
just because DHCP could be conveniently used to suit some purpose, does not 
mean that it _should_ be used to suit that purpose.  I think reasonable people 
can differ about configuring NTP over DHCP, but it really does depend on how 
you are using NTP.   I think the main justification for using DHCP to configure 
NTP is in fact that it is expedient, even though it's not secure.

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