Dear Aleksandar, Thank you for raising an important distinction: Rūpa did not arrive at his Kṛṣṇa-bhakti a posteriori, but he also certainly did not reason his way there by any kind of a priori logic. He begins from the conviction of Kṛṣṇa’s reality and then reasons about Kṛṣṇa, rather than to Kṛṣṇa.
Within the Caitanya-bhakti tradition, Rūpa and others are considered to be enlightened souls with direct experience of Kṛṣṇa. Thus, from this perspective, their epistemic method is something like divya-pratyakṣa-jñāna, knowledge by direct spiritual experience. This is somewhat of a paraphrase of Bhagavad-gītā 9.2, where rāja-vidyā is said to be pratyakṣa-avagamam, understanding by direct experience. The Gītā very often compares ‘knowing’ to ’seeing’, as in the reference at 4.34 to tattva-darśinaḥ, which I would translate as ’seers of categorical truth.' And of course we have the example of Arjuna himself. Thanks again, Aleksandar, for your clarification. Best, Howard > On Jun 24, 2024, at 10:37 AM, Uskokov, Aleksandar > <[email protected]> wrote: > > Dear Howard, > > Could you elaborate on the claim that Rupa assumes the existence of the said > divinities a priori? My impression is that for him these are scriptural > facts. There is a case to be made that some, including Rupa’s nephew Jiva, > have understood some kinds of linguistic cognition to be a priori, in some > sense—I.e., analytic insofar as, say, Himalaya as linguistic fact means > repository of snow and as such linguistic fact cannot be without snow—but is > there anything like it in Rupa’s understanding of the various divinities? > Would it not be more accurate to say that, while he does not derive their > existence from the world, he does not derive them from reason either? > > If so, I think that Matthew's caution stands. In any case, it is perhaps > telling that hardly anyone has a problem registering how the argument from > design has something in common with the Nyaya arguments from productness, > sentience, and the use of instruments, while with Anselm we are grasping for > straws. > > In any case, perhaps a good thing to clarify first is what reason for Anselm > is. > > Best wishes, > Aleksandar > > Get Outlook for iOS <https://aka.ms/o0ukef> > From: INDOLOGY <[email protected]> on behalf of Howard > Resnick via INDOLOGY <[email protected]> > Sent: Monday, June 24, 2024 10:02 AM > To: Matthew Kapstein <[email protected]> > Cc: Indology List <[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [INDOLOGY] Analogues to Anselm's Ontological Arguments in Indian > Philosophy? > > Thank you Matthew for your comments. I will respectfully defend the notion of > a real and significant philosophical link between Anselm and Rupa, and > perhaps other medieval Indian thinkers. > > I realize that this is an Indology group and not a forum on European > scholasticism, however I think the connection between a major Scholastic > thinker and medieval Indian apologetics is worth pursing a little farther > here. > > I suggest that the major problem with the argument against an Anselm-Rupa > link is that it takes Anselm out of his 11c historical context and portrays > him almost as a modern analytic philosopher, concerned with ontology for its > own sake. Thus the claim that “He is sneakily making a purely logical point,” > does not seem consistent with historical evidence. Anselm includes the > argument in his Proslogion, a “meditative prayer” where he declares his > intention as “faith seeking understanding.” ("fides quaerens intellectum" or > "faith seeking understanding”). It would be balanced and accurate to see > Anselm as keenly interested in logic, but sincerely engaging that study in > God’s service, a view entirely consistent with his historical period. > > You mention the opposition of Thomas Aquinas, but Thomas' objection was that > Anselm’s argument is a priori, based on reason alone. Thomas favored > posteriori arguments since he believed that our knowledge, even of God, > begins with sensory experience and proceeds to reason. > > Rūpa, like Anselm, makes an a priori argument, since he a assumes a priori > the existence of Kṛṣṇa, Nāṛāyṇa, Śiva etc. He does not infer their existence > from his experience of the world. Thus the opposition of Thomas reinforces > the link between Anselm and Rupa, rather than refuting it. > > Best wishes, > Howard > > >> On Jun 24, 2024, at 4:06 AM, Matthew Kapstein <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Dear all, >> >> It seems to me that there may be some uncertainties about the precise nature >> of Anselm's argument in this thread. It is not to be identified as an >> argument about "maximal greatness" per se, a topic that was very well >> investigated in the Buddhist context by Paul Griffiths in his book On Being >> Buddha >> https://sunypress.edu/Books/O/On-Being-Buddha2 >> and that seems to me, in one way or another, to be at stake in many of the >> interesting comments made by contributors to thus thread, which concern the >> bigger and better qualities ascribed to the divinity. >> >> This is not what Anslem is doing, however. He is sneakily making a purely >> logical point. >> First, the very conception of "that than which no greater can be conceived" >> must include the concept of being, for that which lacks being is less great >> that that which does not. Note that this premise is not at all about >> superadding or magnifying all sorts of qualities - it concerns, in pure >> abstraction, a logical entailment of the concept "that than which no greater >> can be conceived." >> If we then suppose, as Anselm does, that God alone fills this concept - and >> again it is a purely logical point that "that than which no greater can be >> conceived" must be unque; this follows from the concept itself, call it God >> or what you like - then it follows that the concept of God includes the >> concept of being. >> >> The problem is, of course, that even if we buy into this conceptually (which >> St. Thomas, and I. Kant, for example, did not), it seems to imply only >> something about the concept of God, and not about its real existence. This >> is where the second iteration in terms of necessary being comes in, for the >> concept of necessary being, it would seem, can only apply to a being that >> really is. A necessary being cannot be something that is not. QED >> >> None of the arguments that have so far been adduced in this thread as >> "resembling" Anselm's seem to me to resemble it in fact in its central >> concerns with the logical entailments of conceivability and necessity. I >> have been trying for years to find something in Indian philosophy that might >> prove otherwise, but have not so far succeeded. But Indian philosophy is a >> vast domain, approaching maximal greatness, so something may well turn up. I >> hope that someone will respond to Dan Lusthaus's suggestion about Vallabha, >> for instance, to see whether there might be something there. It is certainly >> true that Indian philosophy knew the main elements from which the >> ontological argument is forged - this much seems true for the Vedantic idea >> of sac-cid-Ananda, which shows us that the very concept of Brahman entails >> its being - but were the few additional steps taken by Anselm ever really >> paralleled? >> >> I suggest that we distinguish clearly between the general idea of maximal >> greatness and Anselm's very precise assertion that any such idea, without >> the explicit assumption of being and the logical entailments thereof, >> remains incomplete. >> >> best to all, >> Matthew >> >> Matthew T. Kapstein >> Professor emeritus >> Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, PSL Research University, Paris >> >> Associate >> The University of Chicago Divinity School >> >> https://ephe.academia.edu/MatthewKapstein >> >> https://vajrabookshop.com/product/the-life-and-work-of-auleshi/ >> >> https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501716218/tibetan-manuscripts-and-early-printed-books-volume-i/#bookTabs=1 >> >> https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501771255/tibetan-manuscripts-and-early-printed-books-volume-ii/#bookTabs=1 >> >> https://brill.com/edcollbook/title/60949 >> >> Sent with Proton Mail <https://proton.me/> secure email. >> >> On Monday, June 24th, 2024 at 8:16 AM, dmitry shevchenko via INDOLOGY >> <[email protected]> wrote: >>> Dear Jeffery, >>> >>> In the Yogasūtra-bhāṣya, attributed to Vyāsa, there is a following >>> argument, which is somewhat akin to the ontological argument. We observe in >>> the world creatures with various cognitive capacities. Some perceive very >>> small things, other very large things, some very remote things, etc. The >>> fact that there are various degrees in cognitive capacities suggests that >>> there must be the highest cognitive degree, i.e., omniscience. And the >>> omniscient being is īśvara. >>> It is not entirely clear whether the purpose of the argument is to prove >>> the existence of God. I believe it is primarily meant to establish the >>> possibility of omniscience, against which argue some Mīmāṃsakas. >>> Nevertheless, it is based on a similar usage of the idea of "greatness" and >>> on conceivability of its possession in the greatest measure... >>> I'm attaching Larson's translation of this argument from the YSBh on the YS >>> 1.25, with an elaboration by Vācaspati Miśra, who further atttempts to >>> establish that omniscience can only be ascribed to God, and not to human >>> teachers such as the Buddha and Mahāvīra. >>> >>> Best wishes, >>> Dimitry >>> >>> On Monday, June 24, 2024 at 01:11:44 AM GMT+3, Jeffery Long via INDOLOGY >>> <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> That is extremely helpful, Howard. Thank you! >>> >>> All the best, >>> Jeff >>> >>> >>> Sent from Yahoo Mail for iPhone >>> <https://mail.onelink.me/107872968?pid=nativeplacement&c=Global_Acquisition_YMktg_315_Internal_EmailSignature&af_sub1=Acquisition&af_sub2=Global_YMktg&af_sub3=&af_sub4=100000604&af_sub5=EmailSignature__Static_> >>> >>> On Sunday, June 23, 2024, 6:07 PM, Howard Resnick <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> Dear Jeff, >>> >>> There is a passage in the Bhakti-rasāmṛta-sindhu by Rūpa Gosvāmī which is a >>> sort of variation on Anselm’s argument. Anselm of course is making an >>> ontological argument for the existence itself of God, whereas Rūpa argues >>> that Kṛṣṇa must be the most complete form or conception of God, in >>> comparison to Nārāyaṇa, Śīva etc, because he possesses the greatest number >>> of divine qualities. >>> >>> What somehow connects Anselm and Rūpa, is that both assume that if God is >>> infinitely great, then the greatest conception of God is closest to the >>> truth. Anselm deploys this argument, of course, in assuming that existence >>> itself is a positive attribute which must therefore be possessed by God. >>> >>> Rūpa assumes existence and then argues in terms of other attributes. But >>> both share the assumption that if God is infinitely great, then then >>> greatest conception is closest to the truth. That is what connects them, in >>> my view. >>> >>> Thanks for the topic! >>> >>> Best wishes, >>> Howard >>> >>>> On Jun 23, 2024, at 12:17 PM, Jeffery Long via INDOLOGY >>>> <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>> >>> Dear Colleagues, >>> >>> Forgive me if this question has already been raised at some point on this >>> list. >>> >>> Are any of you aware of arguments developed in Indian philosophical systems >>> akin to the ontological arguments for the existence of God raised by St. >>> Anselm? The closest thing I can think of is Śaṅkara’s argument that >>> existence is self-evident. >>> >>> With much gratitude in advance, >>> >>> Jeff >>> >>> >>> Dr. Jeffery D. Long >>> Carl W. Zeigler Professor of Religion, Philosophy, & Asian Studies >>> School of Arts & Humanities >>> Elizabethtown College >>> Elizabethtown, PA >>> >>> https://etown.academia.edu/JefferyLong >>> >>> Series Editor, Explorations in Indic Traditions: Ethical, Philosophical, >>> and Theological >>> Lexington Books >>> >>> “One who makes a habit of prayer and meditation will easily overcome all >>> difficulties and remain calm and unruffled in the midst of the trials of >>> life.” (Holy Mother Sarada Devi) >>> >>> “We are a way for the Cosmos to know itself.” (Carl Sagan) >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> INDOLOGY mailing list >>> [email protected] >>> https://list.indology.info/mailman/listinfo/indology >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> INDOLOGY mailing list >>> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >>> https://list.indology.info/mailman/listinfo/indology >> >
_______________________________________________ INDOLOGY mailing list [email protected] https://list.indology.info/mailman/listinfo/indology
