---------------------------------------------------------- FREE for JOIN Indonesia Daily News Online via EMAIL: go to: http://www.indo-news.com/subscribe.html - FREE - FREE - FREE - FREE - FREE - FREE - Please Visit Our Sponsor http://www.indo-news.com/cgi-bin/ads1 ---------------------------------------------------------- Precedence: bulk WHY IS INDONESIA NOT FALLING APART? (part 4 of 4) by Waruno Mahdi 4. ACEH, IRIAN JAYA, AND THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES. The most serious perspectives of a possible breaking loose of parts of Indonesia are not linked with violent unrest of the type that has shaken Amon or Sambas, but with a desire for separation that has become vocal in the provinces of Aceh and Irian Jaya. Apart from currently effective direct reasons for separatist sentiments, there are historical preliminary conditions that "prepared the grounds" for such a development. The populations of both provinces already had by reason of their particular situation in colonial times not become as profoundly integrated as those of the other provinces. Aceh had been the first country now incorporated in Indonesia to have actively upheld relations with the Netherlands (an Acehnese ambassador actually was in the Netherlands in the 17th century), but it was practically the last to be subjugated as Dutch colony (towards the eve of World War I). Having had a relatively developed tradition of literary and theological scholarship of its own before that, Aceh seems on the other hand not to have been integrated into the Dutch system of schooling as thoroughly as e.g. the neigbouring Batak lands, Riau, or Minangkabau country had been. The remoteness and economic underdevelopedness of Western New Guinea (present Irian Jaya) led to only symbolic presence of Dutch colonial administration before the 20th century. The territory continued to be ruled as insignificant backwater all the way till World War II. After Dutch re-occupation in 1946, it was artificially separated from the rest of the colony for reasons that will become clear below, leading also to its being temporarily held back at formal transfer of sovereignty over the former colony to the independent government of Indonesia in 1949. Nevertheless, aspirations for separate independence in both provinces had initially only been upheld by minorities resorting to armed actions. This has meanwhile become different. The respective calls for a separation are now coming from relatively large partions of the population, resorting to prevalently peaceful means of expressing their demands. This leads to a first reassuring conclusion, that even if the further development should lead to separation of the one or the other of these provinces, this will probably not happen as a result of cataclysmic convulsions as suggested by developments in Ambon or Sambas. The problems there are quite unrelated to the ones in the presently considered provinces. This nevertheless does not make such an ultimate outcome of separation any more welcome or desirable, particularly because the separated provinces have much more to lose than a remaining rest-Indonesia. Irian Jaya is the least prepared to take on independence. No country is ideally prepared for independence at the moment of first acquiring it, of course, and must learn in the process. But Irian Jaya is far less prepared than e.g. either Indonesia as a whole was in 1945 or East Timor is today. Large parts of the political movement are still pre-occupied with endearingly sympathetic visions which would not suffer a cruel awakening when confronted with the realities of independence. They leave the political class quite unprepared to endure and overcome the phase of political infighting that always accompanies new independence (like 1946-1948 in Indonesia, or 1974-1975 in East Timor). The country will probably also suffer from a much more lamentable initial inefficiency in economic management than is still reported for neighbouring Papua-New Guinea (or for Indonesia in the 1950s). Irian Jaya is considerably more dependent on, and structurally or organically tied to Indonesia, than East Timor is e.g. as a result of onesided Indonesian staffing of medical and educational facilities and Indonesian engagement in transport and trade. Irian Jaya, furthermore, featuring a significantly greater degree of ethnic diversity than East Timor, practically only has one unifying language, Indonesian Malay which it shares with the rest of Indonesia. One will not be able to find linguistically adequate short-term replacements like for East Timor which is also unified in the use of Portuguese and Tetum. Resorting to Dutch, the language of the former colonial master, is now hardly a realistic option. Withdrawal from local use of Dutch extends over 36 years. Although West New Guinea had in the 1940s been earmarked for later resettlement of Indo-Dutch and Eurasians from Indonesia (which is the reason why it was held apart, as noted above), those of them who wanted or had to leave Indonesia later chose instead to return to the Netherlands, or emigrate to the Americas or Australia. They are not available as volunteers for the transition through an initial phase. Aceh seems much better prepared, and would mainly face standard difficulties all developing nations experience upon attaining independence. It also has the advantage of being ethnically compact, with several centuries of tradition in the use of both Malay and Acehnese as languages with written record. It would seem, therefore, to have the same fair chance as other such nations of either succeeding or failing to cope with the initial trial phase and breaking through to sustained development. The main handicap in Aceh derives from the prolonged period of quite exceptionally brutal repression, which has deeply traumatized a strongly muslim puritan society, not given to relieving public sharing of suppressed stress. At the same time there is a long-standing slumbering feud between a traditional aristicracy and the clergy, which has remained unresolved, and will immediately surface upon achievement of independence. Last but not least, this most faithfully Muslim province of Indonesia is predictably susceptible to inroads of foreign radical Islamic influences challenging the prevailing more balanced domestic Muslim tradition. All this, but especially the traumatized state of public consciousness, will be a determining factor in initial independent political development. One must also reckon with exploitation of initial political strife by supra-national companies. In both provinces, such companies were reported to have relied on the repressive apparatus of the regime in their dealings with local population. Under conditions of separate independence, influence of the companies would introduce an additional polarization between corporate-friendly and population-friendly policy. Any alternative way of allowing this population, and also that of Irian Jaya, to return to a worthy peaceful and democratic life must really be prefered to exposing it in the present traumatized condition to the test of political infighting that invariably accompanies new independence. But even setting aside the circumstances listed above, which seem to let the perspectives of separate independence seem particularly hazardous, there still is one simple consideration. Already under relatively democratic conditions and lawful government, with adequate representation of interests of the provinces, particularly also regarding fair sharing of revenues, there would be no reason to want to negotiate the perilous cliffs of novel independence even without the aggravating circumstances listed above. Indeed, a real separation from Indonesia is probably even now not the final will of the peoples of the provinces. The original reasons leading to popularity of separatist slogans in both provinces was the feeling of being discriminated. In Aceh, local business had suffered a great deal from unfair competition of favoured outside companies having or assumed to have special connections to the top. In Irian Jaya it is an even wider preferential employment of Indonesians from the other islands and insufficient educative opportunities to permit local people from qualifying. In both cases, return to democratic government by rule of law, applying effective measures to fight corruption, collusion, nepotism, and discrimination promises to alleviate the grievances. But the urgent motive behind calls for independence in both provinces was the accumulated emotional hurt and repulsion caused by years of brutal repression of a most barbaric nature. The brutalities of the apparatus, provoked by small minorities waging an armed guerilla campaign, were mainly directed against peaceable civilians. The effect was only an increase in popularity of the respective rebellious minority. Even initial successes of the movement for democratic reform had already sufficed to at first markedly relax the tension, even though newly opened opportunities for expression of opinion led to increased demonstration of separatist demands. The preceding silence had been a force one, and it was the pent up emotions of three decades that was breaking into the open for air. It was a necessary precondition for further settlement of the problems. And already a mild official apology from General Wiranto had the effect of drawing spontaneous reciprocal comments from the population in Aceh, that one still regarded oneself as Indonesian patriots. Particularly the Acehnese had all the reason to do so. They had been among the most resolute and spirited fighters for Indonesian independence in 1946-1949. Even in remote Dutch occupied Western New Guinea, local patriots had struggled for independence as part of Indonesia, before and after 1949. Unfortunately, repressive actions of the military, quite in the tradition of the old regime, not only disavowed its own commander, but delivered a resounding blow to perspectives of a simple settlement of the conflict. Again, militaries shot at civilians, with resulting losses of life, in Aceh as well as in Irian Jaya. This leads us to the actual center of the problem. It lies not in some or other conflict of interest between various ethnic groups, or in having been less strongly integrated during the colonial period. It lies in a condition of the armed forces in its quality as one of the organs of the state, integral to its mechanisms of self-sustainment discussed in the first section above. From a defendor of national territorial unity, it has developed into the main factor or cause of the country's threatening to fall apart. All it's professed efforts to ensure unity are having the adverse effect of antagonizing the population beyond all limits. In the first section it was noted that there has been an intrinsic shift in the establishment standing by to the state, and this has also been reflected in a marked opening towards democracy as manifested be leaping improvements in freedoms of the press, of organization, of expression, and perspectives of the coming general elections. The armed forces, it seems, has not yet moved along with this process beyond some lip service. They still think that shooting at peacefully demonstrating separatists, or sentencing him to draconian prison terms, promotes national unity rather than undermining it. The root of this missmatch between a state in reform and its armed forces lies in a fundamental difference between the role of the latter under the previous military regime and under a democratically reformed state. The issue of so-called "double function" (dwifungsi) of the armed forces is only subordinated to that central problem. Under the Soeharto regime, the military held ultimate political sway. It had the last word in everything, all political and administrative bodies were dominated by the military. Not the armed forces served the nation, but the nation served the armed forces, that was the net result of the take-over of power by Soeharto in 1966 with regard to the function of the armed forces. The reform currently under process requires a full reversal of that inversion. Without that fundamental change, the armed forces will be constantly bringing itself and the state as a whole in trouble. The best intentions on the part of Pak Wiranto will be in vain. As long as his men see themselves as the ultimate masters, his apologies can be countermanded at any time by a lieutenant who commands "fire!". In the organization of Alcoholics Anonymous (AA), a new member must as a first step publicly admit to being an alcoholic, to being an addict of alcohol who is not anymore in command of himself. It is indeed impossible to cure oneself of this addiction without first accepting that one is an addict. For the armed forces too, well meaning declarations of intention will not bring any change, because it will not succeed to repair its relationship with the nation, unless it is determined to repair its relationship to itself. It is not a task of public relations, it is a task of redefining its own identity. The longer it is ashamed of losing face, the longer it will be constantly losing its face in the eyes of the people. It is only natural, that the armed forces command will be extremely hesitant in taking such a step. It will with certainty experience a phase of temporary disfunctionality or at least diminished effectivity. However, this is already partly the case even without the fundamental reform of the armed forces. Happily, Indonesia is not threatened by external enemies. To the North we have befriended ASEAN countries as neighbours. To the South lies Australia which does not seem to be on its toes, waiting for an opportunity to overrun us. Quite on the contrary, we may probably count on all our neighbours to stand by us in a moment of weakness. A temporary slackening of military alertness would perhaps animate hundreds or even thousands of Irianese or Acehnese to run into the streets and wave separatist flags. After a while, they will go home again, nurturing a warm feeling of pride to be citizens of a country were one may do such things. The problem in these provinces is not one of of forcing law and order upon the population, but of return to rule and order in government. In the US, lots of people like to demonstrate the confederate flag, but there is no danger of the Southern states breaking lose. In the former Soviet union, on the other, nobody dared to show separatist symbols or insignia for fear of severe repression. Today, all the federal republics have broken away. Like the alcoholic who must seek support of fellow AA members, the armed forces will only succeed in curing itself, if it opens up to the nation and accepts support from democratic political parties in its reform. The best way to minimize the risk of letting the situation get out of control, is to appeal to the local population for help: ask them to help a repentent armed forces in its period of reformation to uphold peace. Particularly in Aceh and in Irian Jaya, this will have a very beneficial effect. It is in the interest of the armed forces itself, and it is in the interest of the entire nation, and hence also in that of the political parties that hope to govern the nation, that the reform of the armed forces proceeds in an efficent and orderly, but also thorough manner, the sooner the better. All over the world, people like to be proud of their soldiers, like to be confident that they are always there to defend their house and hearth. Indonesians too want an armed forces they rely on and can be proud of, all over the country, from Sabang till Merauke. --- END --- ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Waruno Mahdi tel: +49 30 8413-5411 Faradayweg 4-6 fax: +49 30 8413-3155 14195 Berlin email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Germany WWW: http://w3.rz-berlin.mpg.de/~wm/ ----------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------- SiaR WEBSITE: http://apchr.murdoch.edu.au/minihub/siarlist/maillist.html ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Didistribusikan tgl. 26 Apr 1999 jam 12:55:32 GMT+1 oleh: Indonesia Daily News Online <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.Indo-News.com/ ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
