---------------------------------------------------------- Visit Indonesia Daily News Online HomePage: http://www.indo-news.com/ Please Visit Our Sponsor http://www.indo-news.com/cgi-bin/ads1 ---------------------------------------------------------- Excerpt: But it is East Timor that has the greatest potential to politicise=20 defence in a way not seen here since the Vietnam War. If troops from the=20 Darwin-based 1st Brigade are deployed to East Timor on peace-keeping duties = -=20 a distinct possibility - the management and direction of the ADF will come=20 under more public scrutiny, as will the political acumen and leadership=20 skills of John Moore. The East Timor imbroglio has already exposed some of the weaknesses and=20 contradictions in defence strategy. Some within the defence community seem t= o=20 feel East Timor is a distraction from the real business of defence, which=20 ought to be about defeating armed attacks on Australia by hostile powers. Sydney Morning Herald Tuesday, August 10, 1999=20 DEFENCE =20 Major rethink of strategic priorities needed =20 The problems in defence go much deeper than a clash between the minister and=20 the bureacracy, writes ALAN DUPONT=20 Two important conclusions can be drawn from the litany of public relations=20 disasters recently suffered by the Department of Defence which culminated in=20 last month's peremptory sacking of the departmental head, Paul Barratt. First, for the first time in recent memory, defence is shaping to become a=20 significant domestic political issue. Neither the Government nor Labor seems=20 to have grasped this. Second, many of the problems in defence relate to=20 fundamental questions of strategy, force structure and resources, and go wel= l=20 beyond the tensions that exist between Defence Minister John Moore's office=20 and senior departmental officers. Unless these problems are satisfactorily resolved, they will undermine the=20 future capability and readiness of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to the=20 detriment of national security. Australians are showing more sensitivity to and interest in defence issues,=20 although their concerns are not yet clearly focused or articulated. This reflects not only dismay and anger at the perceived inadequacy of=20 management within the department, but anxiety about the general deterioratio= n=20 in Australia's security environment, especially ongoing violence and=20 instability in Indonesia. Public anxiety is driven less by fear of conventional military attack or=20 domination by a hostile foreign power - the raison d'e^tre for defence=20 spending during the Cold War - than by a confluence of emerging security=20 issues that were all but invisible on the defence radar screen a decade ago. Ethnic strife in South-East Asia, the strategic fallout from the Asian=20 economic crisis, the security of the Sydney Olympics and an upsurge in drug=20 trafficking, people smuggling and illegal fishing have all heightened=20 Australians' sense of vulnerability. But it is East Timor that has the greatest potential to politicise defence i= n=20 a way not seen here since the Vietnam War. If troops from the Darwin-based=20 1st Brigade are deployed to East Timor on peace-keeping duties - a distinct=20 possibility - the management and direction of the ADF will come under more=20 public scrutiny, as will the political acumen and leadership skills of John=20 Moore. The East Timor imbroglio has already exposed some of the weaknesses and=20 contradictions in defence strategy. Some within the defence community seem t= o=20 feel East Timor is a distraction from the real business of defence, which=20 ought to be about defeating armed attacks on Australia by hostile powers. But in the post-Cold War world, the ADF must be a flexible force and defence=20 planners must be prepared to allocate significant resources to other kinds o= f=20 tasks, of which East Timor is representative. Before the Howard Government, the central imperative of defence planning -=20 accepted by both Coalition and Labor governments - was that the ADF should=20 focus primarily on the defence of the Australian continent and the air and=20 sea approaches to our north. The great virtues of this bipartisan approach=20 were that it commanded overwhelming public support, reassured our neighbours=20 that Australia had no hostile intent, and was affordable. Defence of=20 Australia also provided a coherent strategic policy framework for our defenc= e=20 planners. Unfortunately, that coherence has been lost. Current strategic guidance is=20 confused and ambivalent and does not adequately reflect the realities of=20 Australia's security environment. The Government's commitment to =ECa more=20 outward-looking=ED defence posture and its talk of expeditionary forces and=20 offshore deployments has stretched, beyond recognition, the original concept=20 of defence of Australia. The policy appears to have far more in common with=20 the outdated =ECforward defence=ED strategy of the 1950s and 1960s. For defence planners it is axiomatic that force structure and operational=20 doctrine should be driven by the most likely, not the least likely,=20 contingencies. Why, then, is so much of our effort being put into projecting=20 military power well beyond our shores?=20 Aside from the questionable strategic logic and political wisdom of returnin= g=20 to a form of forward defence, it is increasingly evident that the ADF is=20 struggling to cope with the myriad demands on its time and resources. Not only is it supposed to be able to fight a =EChigh-tech=ED war at conside= rable=20 distance from Australia, it is also required to provide forces for=20 continental defence, peace-keeping operations and the undeclared war against=20 drug smugglers, people smuggling and illegal fishing. As well, it has an=20 important counter-terrorist role and must be ready to evacuate Australian=20 citizens from overseas. If the Government believes that the ADF can do all these things with its=20 current resources, it needs to think again. Defence spending is at its lowes= t=20 for decades; $11 billion a year does not come close to buying the kind of=20 capability required to meet the ADF's tasks, particularly given the looming=20 problem of obsolescence. During the next decade a number of critical but aging defence platforms and=20 weapons systems will have to be replaced. New equipment purchases will absor= b=20 a substantial portion of future defence funding without guaranteeing the=20 ADF's ability to defend Australia and meet the diverse security challenges o= f=20 the next millennium. A further worry is the way in which our defence relationship with the United=20 States is distorting our equipment purchases and operational priorities. We=20 need to be far more judicious and hard-headed about acquiring expensive,=20 state-of-the art technology and capabilities from the US. These are not trivial matters and they demand as much attention from the=20 Government as tax reform and the republic. National defence is a deadly=20 serious business and the consequences of not getting it right will affect=20 each and every Australian. - Alan Dupont is director of the Asia-Pacific Program at the Australian=20 National University's Strategic and Defence Studies Centre =20 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Didistribusikan tgl. 9 Aug 1999 jam 19:03:02 GMT+1 oleh: Indonesia Daily News Online <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://www.Indo-News.com/ ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
