Thank you for sending me the new draft, I am currently studying it. I noticed 
that binding clearing was mentioned in section 3.5 and DHCP RELEASE was 
mentioned. My question is whether there are any clearing mechanisms for binding 
clearing in the IPv6 protocol? If there are, what mechanism does it follow? Can 
you kindly provide me with some relevant information? Thank you!

Best regards,
Huanglu


-----Original Messages-----
From: "Lin He" <he-...@tsinghua.edu.cn>
Sent Time: 2023-06-01 16:21:15 (Thursday)
To: int-area@ietf.org
Cc:
Subject: Fw: New Version Notification for draft-bi-intarea-savi-wlan-00.txt

Hi, all.

We submitted an individual draft to the intarea working group a few days ago. 
This draft mainly describes a source address validation solution for wireless 
LANs.

We warmly welcome your valuable feedback and comments.

Thanks in advance.

--
Lin He

-----Original Messages-----
From: internet-dra...@ietf.org
Sent Time: 2023-05-27 20:03:34 (Saturday)
To: "Jianping Wu" <jianp...@cernet.edu.cn>, "Jun Bi" <ju...@cernet.edu.cn>, 
"Lin He" <he-...@tsinghua.edu.cn>, "Tao Lin" <lin...@h3c.com>, "You Wang" 
<y...@opennetworking.org>
Cc:
Subject: New Version Notification for draft-bi-intarea-savi-wlan-00.txt


A new version of I-D, draft-bi-intarea-savi-wlan-00.txt has been successfully 
submitted by Lin He and posted to the IETF repository.

Name:draft-bi-intarea-savi-wlan
Revision:00
Title:A SAVI Solution for WLAN
Document date:2023-05-27
Group:Individual Submission
Pages:16
URL:            
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-bi-intarea-savi-wlan-00.txt
Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bi-intarea-savi-wlan/
Htmlized:       https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-bi-intarea-savi-wlan


Abstract:
   This document describes a source address validation solution for
   WLANs where 802.11i or other security mechanisms are enabled to
   secure MAC addresses.  This mechanism snoops NDP and DHCP packets to
   bind IP addresses to MAC addresses, and relies on the security of MAC
   addresses guaranteed by 802.11i or other mechanisms to filter IP
   spoofing packets.  It can work in the special situations described in
   the charter of SAVI (Source Address Validation Improvements)
   workgroup, such as multiple MAC addresses on one interface.  This
   document describes three different deployment scenarios, with
   solutions for migration of binding entries when hosts move from one
   access point to another.




The IETF Secretariat

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