On Mon, Dec 16, 2019 at 2:15 AM, Alexey Budankov
<alexey.budan...@linux.intel.com> wrote:
>
> Open access to perf_events monitoring for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged
> processes.
> For backward compatibility reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains
> open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage
> for secure perf_events monitoring is discouraged with respect to
> CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability.
>
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budan...@linux.intel.com>
> ---
> include/linux/perf_event.h | 9 ++++++---
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h index
> 34c7c6910026..52313d2cc343 100644
> --- a/include/linux/perf_event.h
> +++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h
> @@ -1285,7 +1285,8 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)
>
> static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr) {
> - if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 &&
> + !(capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)))
> return -EACCES;
>
> return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL); @@
> -1293,7 +1294,8 @@ static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct
> perf_event_attr *attr)
>
> static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr) {
> - if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 &&
> + !(capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)))
> return -EACCES;
>
> return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_CPU); @@ -
> 1301,7 +1303,8 @@ static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr
> *attr)
>
> static inline int perf_allow_tracepoint(struct perf_event_attr *attr) {
> - if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 &&
> + !(capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)))
> return -EPERM;
>
> return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT);
> --
> 2.20.1
Thanks. I like the idea of CAP_SYS_PERFMON that does not require
CAP_SYS_ADMIN. It makes granting users ability to run perf a bit safer.
I see a lot of "(capable(CAP_SYS_PERFMON) || capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)" constructs
now. Maybe wrapping it in an " inline bool perfmon_capable()" defined
somewhere (like in /include/linux/capability.h)?
- Igor
_______________________________________________
Intel-gfx mailing list
Intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/intel-gfx
