Dan, I'm inclined to concur with Bill Sommerfeld and you that we don't have a "running code" problem, but my original email suggests what could be done to retire the old identifiers _if_ we did have such a problem.
Thanks, --David > -----Original Message----- > From: ipsec-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:ipsec-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Dan > Harkins > Sent: Monday, December 21, 2009 3:53 PM > To: Black, David > Cc: y...@checkpoint.com; dhark...@lounge.org; kivi...@iki.fi; ipsec@ietf.org; > Black, David > Subject: Re: [IPsec] IKEv2 Diffie-Hellman Elliptic curve mess (RFC4753, > RFC5114, RFC4869, and draft- > solinas-rfc4753bis-01) > > > Hi David, > > I don't believe there is an actual "running code" problem. It's > just a documentation problem and the errata corrects it. > > The thing is, _if_ a running code problem exists the proposal to > add new identifiers for the exact same ECP definitions would not fix > it. > > Dan. > > On Mon, December 21, 2009 10:54 am, black_da...@emc.com wrote: > > Dan, > > > >> If we allocate new numbers to do it right then we will, in fact, live > >> forever with an ambiguous interpretation of groups 19, 20, and 21. I > >> agree we should fix the problem and not live with ambiguity. The > >> proposal > >> to allocate new numbers doesn't seem to do that though. > > > > Fine, here's how to accomplish that goal - the RFC that allocates > > the new group numbers should: > > 1) explain why the group numbers 19, 20 and 21 are ambiguous; > > 2) state that group numbers 19, 20 and 21 "SHOULD NOT be used"; > > 3) instruct IANA to remove the group number registrations for > > 19, 20 and 21 in a fashion that prevents reallocation; and > > 4) obsolete RFC 4753. > > That should avoid long term problems. > > > > That said, I'd like to see more reason to believe that there is > > an actual "running code" problem before doing something this drastic. > > If most people working with elliptic curve "just know" that only > > one coordinate is used, we might not have a problem in practice. > > > > Thanks, > > --David > > ---------------------------------------------------- > > David L. Black, Distinguished Engineer > > EMC Corporation, 176 South St., Hopkinton, MA 01748 > > +1 (508) 293-7953 FAX: +1 (508) 293-7786 > > black_da...@emc.com Mobile: +1 (978) 394-7754 > > ---------------------------------------------------- > > > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: ipsec-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:ipsec-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf > >> Of Dan Harkins > >> Sent: Monday, December 21, 2009 1:44 PM > >> To: Yaron Sheffer > >> Cc: ipsec@ietf.org; Yoav Nir; Tero Kivinen > >> Subject: Re: [IPsec] IKEv2 Diffie-Hellman Elliptic curve mess (RFC4753, > >> RFC5114, RFC4869, and draft- > >> solinas-rfc4753bis-01) > >> > >> > >> Yaron, > >> > >> If we allocate new numbers to do it right then we will, in fact, live > >> forever with an ambiguous interpretation of groups 19, 20, and 21. I > >> agree we should fix the problem and not live with ambiguity. The > >> proposal > >> to allocate new numbers doesn't seem to do that though. > >> > >> Dan. > >> > >> On Mon, December 21, 2009 7:48 am, Yaron Sheffer wrote: > >> > Hi Tero, > >> > > >> > I support your position (and disagree with Yoav). We had better fix > >> this > >> > problem now by allocating a few more numbers, than live forever with > >> an > >> > ambiguous interpretation to the numbers that everybody's using. > >> > > >> > Thanks, > >> > Yaron > >> > > >> > -----Original Message----- > >> > From: ipsec-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:ipsec-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf > >> Of > >> > Tero Kivinen > >> > Sent: Monday, December 21, 2009 13:21 > >> > To: Yoav Nir > >> > Cc: ipsec@ietf.org > >> > Subject: Re: [IPsec] IKEv2 Diffie-Hellman Elliptic curve mess > >> (RFC4753, > >> > RFC5114, RFC4869, and draft-solinas-rfc4753bis-01) > >> > > >> > Yoav Nir writes: > >> >> If there is such an implementation, then it's not interoperating > >> >> with all the other implementations and should be fixed. > >> > > >> > It is following the published RFC, so why should it be fixed. I think > >> > everybody agreed that making major non-interoperable change in the > >> > errata was not proper way of fixing the thing (there were lots of > >> > developers who had missed that). > >> > > >> > This whole discussion about the errata started because one implementor > >> > was implementing the RFC and wanted to make sure that the y is really > >> > added, and he wanted to make sure that he understood it correctly as > >> > that would eman that those groups cannot be made complient to FIPS > >> > 140-2. > >> > > >> > He had not noticed the errata. There were also other people who had > >> > not noticed the errata (including me). > >> > > >> > I am sure there is also people who do not follow the IPsec list and > >> > still do implement things (following IPsec list is not really > >> > requirement for implementing IPsec). > >> > > >> > I am only person in our office who regularly follow IPsec list and all > >> > others just take RFCs and read them and write code based on them. I am > >> > not sure if any of those people actually even know how to find > >> > errata... > >> > > >> > Made quick poll around the office, and found out that noboby here had > >> > checked any of the errata for any of the RFCs they have worked on. > >> > They said they usually do check for rfc-index to see if the RFC was > >> > updated or obsoleted, but that is it. > >> > > >> >> If someone shipped something like that, then the only reason they > >> >> haven't noticed yet, is because they (1) didn't test it well enough, > >> > > >> > Doing testing against your implementation does not detect that kind of > >> > problem as everything works fine. Also for quite a lot of IPsec > >> > vendors the main goal is to make implementation which works with their > >> > own products and the secondary goal is that it works with other > >> > vendor's product too. > >> > > >> >> and (2) their customers are using some other option like 1024-bit > >> >> MODP group (and 3DES, but that's beside the point) > >> > > >> > That is most likely true for all current IPsec implementations. > >> > Elliptic curves are not really used that much yet. That is the reason > >> > I want to fix this problem now, not move it to future. > >> > > >> >> Anyway, making everyone add a new group "28" just so nobody needs to > >> >> patch their old implementation of group "20" seems like wasted > >> >> effort to me. We can keep group 20, and fix the spec to prescribe > >> >> what everybody is doing anyway. > >> > > >> > I do not want to see the support request saying that our product does > >> > not interoperate vendor X's product when using group 19 and then later > >> > find out that is because the other vendor has implemented RFC4753 > >> > and didn't notice the errata. > >> > > >> > Also it will most likely take our customer and our support quite a > >> > long time before they even realize why recipient of IKE_AUTH will > >> > simply drop the packet because of wrong MAC. After that wasted effort > >> > I know that it will come to me, and I need to explain to our customer > >> > that our code is correct and the other implementation was also correct > >> > when they wrote the code, but they are not correct anymore... > >> > > >> > I do not think the elliptic curves are used that much in the current > >> > IPsec installations, so I think we still have time to fix this problem > >> > properly. > >> > -- > >> > kivi...@iki.fi > >> > _______________________________________________ > >> > IPsec mailing list > >> > IPsec@ietf.org > >> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec > >> > > >> > Scanned by Check Point Total Security Gateway. > >> > _______________________________________________ > >> > IPsec mailing list > >> > IPsec@ietf.org > >> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec > >> > > >> > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> IPsec mailing list > >> IPsec@ietf.org > >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec > > > > _______________________________________________ > > IPsec mailing list > > IPsec@ietf.org > > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec > > > > > _______________________________________________ > IPsec mailing list > IPsec@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec _______________________________________________ IPsec mailing list IPsec@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
