Hi Steve On Mar 6, 2012, at 11:54 PM, Stephen Hanna wrote:
> So please review this short document and send comments. While the draft does a good job of describing use cases, and certain inadequate solutions, I think it's missing a description of why this is hard. Even if we accept the solution of a star topology, where a satellite needs only have one single tunnel, there are really two choices: 1. that each satellite know about all the protected networks of all the gateways in the configuration, or 2. that satellites send all traffic to the "core" or "hub" gateways. This includes clear traffic (as in HTTP to facebook.com). This increased the load even more. If you don't want #2, then the satellite still needs to know about every IP address whether it is protected by some gateway (and therefore needs to go in the tunnel), or not (and so packets with that destination should go out in the clear). Since the protected networks change, this requires that information to propagate throughout the network, and dynamic updates to SPD If we don't want a star topology, the gateways or endpoints still need to know what is or is not encrypted. They also need to either know about all peers, or be able to find the peer and (securely) learn how it should authenticate. Either way, without a star topology, you need dynamic updates to PAD. I think the draft should mention this. Yoav _______________________________________________ IPsec mailing list IPsec@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
