Hi Rahul, Yaron,
Hi Rahul,
I am not aware of any additional conditions.
Sorry to pop up, but doesn't text from RFC5998 apply only
to EAP-only authentication? Isn't it an additional condition?
I mean, that if you perform EAP authentication, as described
in RFC5996, i.e. when responder does send AUTH payload
in its first reply to IKE_AUTH, then even if you use
EAP method with mutual authentiaction, the responder
must use public signature to compute this AUTH payload.
So, from my reading, RFC5998 updates RFC5996 in the sense,
that responder is not needed to send this AUTH payload
(and therefore, to use PK signature to compute it)
if (and only if) it receives EAP_ONLY_AUTHENTICATION and honors it.
Regards,
Valery.
EAP-AKA is actually listed in the table in RFC 5998, Sec. 4.
Thanks,
Yaron
On 09/11/2014 08:44 AM, Rahul Vaidya wrote:
Thanks for the quick reply, Yaron,
So does it mean that if an EAP method provides mutual authentication
(e.g., EAP-AKA), then this particular text from 5996 does not apply? Or
are their further conditions which are not mentioned in 5998 where still
the public key based authentication is required?
Regards,
Rahul
On Thu, Sep 11, 2014 at 11:05 AM, Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.i...@gmail.com
<mailto:yaronf.i...@gmail.com>> wrote:
Hi Rahul,
This is why RFC 5998 is listed as "updates 5996". So RFC 5998 does
apply here. Note that it only applies in specific cases, and for
specific EAP methods.
Yes, we should have updated the text in RFC 5996 to refer to 5998,
but we forgot. Sigh.
Thanks,
Yaron
On 09/11/2014 06:56 AM, Rahul Vaidya wrote:
Dear IPsec Experts,
In RFC 4306, 5996 as well as
draft-kivinen-ipsecme-ikev2-__rfc5996bis,
there is a statement:
"An implementation using EAP MUST also use a public-key-based
authentication of the server to the client before the EAP
exchange
begins, even if the EAP method offers mutual authentication."
RFC 5998 which updates 5996 says:
"This document specifies how EAP methods that provide mutual
authentication and key agreement can be used to provide
extensible
responder authentication for IKEv2 based on methods other than
public
key signatures."
The 2 statements are contradictory, given the 'MUST' requirement
for
public -key based authentication in RFC 5996.
I request a view from the IPsec community on whether public key
based
authentication can be avoided without impacting the security of
the
connection/network.
Regards,
Rahul Vaidya
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