On 3/28/19 2:19 PM, Panos Kampanakis (pkampana) wrote:
> Thanks Tobias, Valery and Stefan. 
>
> Imo Classic McEliece is impractical for use in live key negotiations in 
> protocols like TLS, IKE, SSH etc. NIST will standardize more practical and 
> secure postquantum KEMs and the added complexity for McEliece is not 
> necessary. I understand that others might want McEliece because they trust it 
> more. In that case, I suggest the mechanism described in #6 to be a "MAY" in 
> the draft. 
>
> Panos
Hi Panos,

as this draft does not specify any new key exchange methods I would not
include it in this document at all.
Best would probably be in a eventual future draft that also introduces
McEliece
and/or NTS-KEM transform ID for use with IKEv2.

Regards,
Tobias

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