On 3/28/19 2:19 PM, Panos Kampanakis (pkampana) wrote: > Thanks Tobias, Valery and Stefan. > > Imo Classic McEliece is impractical for use in live key negotiations in > protocols like TLS, IKE, SSH etc. NIST will standardize more practical and > secure postquantum KEMs and the added complexity for McEliece is not > necessary. I understand that others might want McEliece because they trust it > more. In that case, I suggest the mechanism described in #6 to be a "MAY" in > the draft. > > Panos Hi Panos,
as this draft does not specify any new key exchange methods I would not include it in this document at all. Best would probably be in a eventual future draft that also introduces McEliece and/or NTS-KEM transform ID for use with IKEv2. Regards, Tobias _______________________________________________ IPsec mailing list IPsec@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
