Hi Adam, Thanks for the feed back. All your comments have been fixed on the current local version available at: https://github.com/mglt/draft-mglt-ipsecme-implicit-iv/blob/master/draft-ietf-ipsecme-implicit-iv.txt
We expect to publish the version tomorrow. Yours, Daniel On Tue, Oct 15, 2019 at 10:51 PM Adam Roach via Datatracker < nore...@ietf.org> wrote: > Adam Roach has entered the following ballot position for > draft-ietf-ipsecme-implicit-iv-07: Yes > > When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all > email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this > introductory paragraph, however.) > > > Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html > for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. > > > The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ipsecme-implicit-iv/ > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > COMMENT: > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Thanks for the work on this mechanism. I have no substantive comments > beyond those that have already been shared, although I do have some > minor editorial comments. > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > §2: > > > In some context, such as IoT, it may be preferable to avoid carrying > > Nit: "...some contexts..." > > Fixed > --------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > §5: > > > An initiator supporting this feature SHOULD propose implicit IV > > algorithms in the Transform Type 1 (Encryption Algorithm) > > Substructure of the Proposal Substructure inside the SA Payload. > > Please expand "SA" on first use. > > Fixed > --------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > 7. Security Consideration > > Nit: "Considerations" > Fixed > > --------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > §7: > > > extensions ([RFC6311], [RFC7383]) do allow it to repeat, so there is > > no an easy way to derive unique IV from IKEv2 header fields. > > Nit: "...not an easy way..." > Fixed > > > _______________________________________________ > IPsec mailing list > IPsec@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec >
_______________________________________________ IPsec mailing list IPsec@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
