Slides: 
https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/99/materials/slides-99-saag-post-quantum-cryptography

Video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=abmd1n5WUvc&t=1451s 


On 12/11/19, 11:36 AM, "Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)" <sfluh...@cisco.com> wrote:

    Did Kenny make this statement in the context of postquantum cryptography 
(that is, public key algorithms that are believed to be secure even if the 
adversary has a quantum computer)?
    
    That would certainly be a reasonable statement (as most postquantum 
algorithms are fairly new, and are still being cryptographically vetted).
    
    On the other hand, this specific draft doesn't involve any postquantum 
algorithms; it relies only on currently accepted algorithms, and so Kenny's 
caution would not apply.
    
    > -----Original Message-----
    > From: Salz, Rich <rs...@akamai.com>
    > Sent: Wednesday, December 11, 2019 11:23 AM
    > To: last-c...@ietf.org
    > Cc: ipsec@ietf.org; ipsecme-cha...@ietf.org; david.walterm...@nist.gov;
    > draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ik...@ietf.org
    > Subject: Re: Last Call: <draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-09.txt> (Postquantum
    > Preshared Keys for IKEv2) to Proposed Standard
    > 
    > We are seeing a flurry of these kind of “post quantum protection” things.
    > This is premature. The co-chair of the CFRG, Kenny Paterson, said so 
awhile
    > back.
    > 
    > At best, this should be EXPERIMENTAL.
    > 
    > I would like to see an IESG policy that makes all drafts on this topic be
    > EXPERIMENTAL.
    > 
    
    

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