Daniel,

Back at it, now that ASTM is behind me...

what will it take to bring this in line with SCHC.  I don't know SCHC well enough to pick up the differences.

What will it take to add AES-GCM-12 to supported ciphers by IKE (and thus ESP)?  For my use case, I have a hard time seeing why I need a 16-byte ICV.  Even an 30 min operation with streaming video is a limited number of packets.  I am going to talk to my contact at DJI to see what information they are willing to share...

Bob

On 5/16/22 16:47, Robert Moskowitz wrote:
Thanks, Daniel for the update.

Now some comments.

    The necessary state is held within the IPsec Security Association and

   The document specifies the necessary parameters of the EHC Context to
   allow compression of ESP and the most common included protocols, such
   as IPv4, IPv6, UDP and TCP and the corresponding EHC Rules.

Should any reference be made to cipher compression?  At least reference to 8750?  Or since this is just the abs

   It also
   defines the Diet-ESP EHC Strategy which compresses up to 32 bytes per
   packet for traditional IPv6 VPN and up to 66 bytes for IPv6 VPN sent
   over a single TCP or UDP session.


In UDP transport I am reducing 18 bytes (assuming cipher with zero padding) to 4 bytes.  Also worth noting here...


   On the other hand, in IoT
   communications, sending extra bytes can significantly impact the
   battery life of devices and thus the life time of the device. The
   document describes a framework that optimizes the networking overhead
   associated to IPsec/ESP for these devices.


You say nothing about constrained comm links.  This compression may make ESP viable over links like LoRaWAN.

   ESP Header Compression (EHC) chooses another form of context
   agreement, which is similar to the one defined by Static Context
   Header Compression (SCHC).

Reference rfc 8724.

And more than 'similar"?  Maybe "based on the one"?

   The context
   itself can be negotiated during the key agreement, which allows only
   minimal the changes to the actual ESP implementation.

I don't get this.  What only allows minimal changes?  The key agreement protocol or ECH?  If the later then perhaps:

   The context
   itself can be negotiated during the key agreement, which then needs only
   minimal the changes to the actual ESP implementation.

More for introduction:

Perhaps you can add that in transport mode, an SA may be for a single transport/port to tune the ECH for that use and that multiple SAs could be negotiated for this case.

Question:  Can a single IKE exchange produce multiple SAs?

Here is my use case:

Between the UA and GCS are two flows.  One for Command and Control (C2) the other streaming video.  Both over UDP, but different ports.  So instead of having carry the UDP ports in all the messages, negotiate separate SAs with the appropriate ECH.

Ah, I see this in Sec 5.  You should say something about this in the intro.

sec 4.

   EHC is able to compress any protocol encapsulated in ESP and ESP
   itself.

No really true per other claims.  Does it offer compressing RTP? I need that, probably, for my streaming video app.

to compress any IP and transport protocol...

And only TCP and UDP are shown, what about, say, SCTP?

BTW, I note that you use 'IKEv2'.  At this point is that really needed?  Should just IKE be enough?  Has not IKEv1 been depreicated?

6.  EHC Context


   The EHC Context is defined on a per-SA basis.  A context can be
   defined for any protocol encapsulated with ESP and for ESP itself.

Should that be "any IP or Transport protocol"?  To exclude layer 5 protocols (CoAP, RTP,,,)?

Layer 5 protocols SHOULD be via standard SCHC with the SCHC Rule ID included...

Or maybe 'typically'?  As some layer 5 might be easy?  RTP maybe?

So this is it for this round of comments.  I am looking at Appdx A and making a UDP example.  Including IIV.

Bob

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