Paul Wouters via Datatracker <[email protected]> wrote: > Also RFC 5723 states: ``` The keys and cryptographic protection > algorithms should be at least 128 bits in strength. ``` IF we live in > Grover universe, perhaps that should be 256 bits in strength? And since > we are making things quantum safe with this document, perhaps we should > then at least state session tickets should be 256 bits. Note if we do, > then this document must Update: RFC 5723. Perhaps this note on 5723 can > be added in the Security Considerations Section paragraph that talks > about Grover and Shor.
My understanding of this document is that it tells us how to do multiple KE exchanges, as state in the abstrct: Another possible application is the ability to combine several key exchanges in situations when no single key exchange algorithm is trusted by both initiator and responder. It seems that if one wants a particular safety against a Grover universe, that we should update RFC8247, or create a companion document. I don't think that we should embed everything in this document. -- Michael Richardson <[email protected]> . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting ) Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide
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