update/obsolete RFC 8247 From: John Mattsson <[email protected]> Date: Saturday, 7 December 2024 at 09:55 To: Rebecca Guthrie <[email protected]>, Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) <[email protected]>, [email protected] <[email protected]> Cc: Kampanakis, Panos <[email protected]>, Tero Kivinen <[email protected]> Subject: Re: New Version Notification for draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2-09.txt Rebecca Guthrie wrote: >I expected to see an adoption call issued before Dublin
+1 In addition to adopting and publishing this we also need to update/obsolete to make ML-KEM MUST implement. Cheers, John From: Rebecca Guthrie <[email protected]> Date: Friday, 6 December 2024 at 18:47 To: Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) <[email protected]>, [email protected] <[email protected]> Cc: John Mattsson <[email protected]>, Kampanakis, Panos <[email protected]>, Tero Kivinen <[email protected]> Subject: RE: New Version Notification for draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2-09.txt You don't often get email from [email protected]. Learn why this is important<https://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification> +1; I expected to see an adoption call issued before Dublin after several folks expressed support for a call (following https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ipsec/G-7lcrHXSm60gjvY4UupBCiBlwM/) Rebecca Rebecca Guthrie she/her Center for Cybersecurity Standards (CCSS) Cybersecurity Collaboration Center (CCC) National Security Agency (NSA) From: Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) <[email protected]> Sent: Thursday, December 5, 2024 3:28 PM To: Rebecca Guthrie (GOV) <[email protected]>; [email protected] Cc: John Mattsson <[email protected]>; Kampanakis, Panos <[email protected]> Subject: RE: New Version Notification for draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2-09.txt Going over this again: is there a specific reason we should *not* adopt this draft? We (at least, the people concerned about PQ security) need it, and I do not see any downsides to this straightforward draft. If there are no objections, what do we do to move this draft forward? From: Rebecca Guthrie <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Sent: Tuesday, November 5, 2024 6:09 AM To: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> Cc: John Mattsson <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>; Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>; Kampanakis, Panos <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Subject: RE: New Version Notification for draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2-09.txt I also support working group adoption Rebecca Guthrie she/her Center for Cybersecurity Standards (CCSS) Cybersecurity Collaboration Center (CCC) National Security Agency (NSA) From: John Mattsson <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Sent: Monday, November 4, 2024 5:30 PM To: Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>; Kampanakis, Panos <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>; [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> Subject: [IPsec] Re: New Version Notification for draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2-09.txt >I would like to second the request to make this a working group item. +1 From: Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer) <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Date: Monday, 4 November 2024 at 18:23 To: Kampanakis, Panos <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>, [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> Subject: [IPsec] Re: New Version Notification for draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2-09.txt I would like to second the request to make this a working group item. > -----Original Message----- > From: Kampanakis, Panos > <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> > Sent: Monday, November 4, 2024 12:15 PM > To: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> > Subject: [IPsec] FW: New Version Notification for draft-kampanakis-ml-kem- > ikev2-09.txt > > FYI, draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2-09 incorporates the last feedback for the > -08 version except for the test vectors which I will add later. > > I would like to ask the WG to finalize the decision about leaving the draft > as-is > and using the already assigned OIDs or adopting it as an IPSECME WG item. > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> > <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> > Sent: Monday, November 4, 2024 11:52 AM > To: Ravago, Gerardo <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>; Kampanakis, > Panos > <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> > Subject: [EXTERNAL] New Version Notification for draft-kampanakis-ml-kem- > ikev2-09.txt > > CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click > links or open attachments unless you can confirm the sender and know the > content is safe. > > > > A new version of Internet-Draft draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2-09.txt has > been successfully submitted by Panos Kampanakis and posted to the IETF > repository. > > Name: draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2 > Revision: 09 > Title: Post-quantum Hybrid Key Exchange with ML-KEM in the Internet Key > Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) > Date: 2024-11-04 > Group: Individual Submission > Pages: 10 > URL: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2-09.txt > Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2/ > HTML: > https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2-09.html<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2-> > 09.html > HTMLized: > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-> > ikev2 > Diff: > https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url2=draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-ikev2-09<https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url2=draft-kampanakis-ml-kem-> > ikev2-09 > > Abstract: > > NIST recently standardized ML-KEM, a new key encapsulation mechanism, > which can be used for quantum-resistant key establishment. This > draft specifies how to use ML-KEM as an additional key exchange in > IKEv2 along with traditional key exchanges. This Post-Quantum > Traditional Hybrid Key Encapsulation Mechanism approach allows for > negotiating IKE and Child SA keys which are safe against > cryptanalytically-relevant quantum computers and theoretical > weaknesses in ML-KEM. > > > > The IETF Secretariat > > > _______________________________________________ > IPsec mailing list -- [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> > To unsubscribe send an email to > [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> _______________________________________________ IPsec mailing list -- [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
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