I have a comment on the presentation of draft-hu-ipsecme-pqt-hybrid-auth-02 in the session today. On the slides <https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/123/materials/slides-123-ipsecme-post-quantum-traditional-hybrid-pki-authentication-in-ikev2-00#page=8> it says that it is intended to allow key-reuse among standalone and composite keys with the currently proposed LAMPS signature combiner <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs-07.html>. The reason that is given there is that the context parameter that is set should mitigate the security concerns in this case.

I want to raise awareness that the signature combiner that you are using will exhibit a principal signature forgery vulnerability in the scenario where an attacker downgrades the composite key to a traditional-only key. In that case the forged message takes the specific form of the message representative M' in the LAMPS composite sig draft <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs-07.html#section-3.2-1>. The context parameter that is intended to be used by the authors doesn't prevent this.

I don't understand enough about IPsec to say whether the described downgrade like this is possible. I suggest that the authors verify this.

Generally, I recommend that the authors choose the signature combiner based on an evaluation of its security features. Even if it can be ruled out that the forged messages are meaningful protocol messages, there might be problems when a formal verification of the protocol is conducted. I don't think that this combiner is suitable for other protocols in general. The mere fact that its use entails further security analysis is reason enough to be careful in my view. Possibly, using straightforward parallel signatures is the better choice in your case.

Falko

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*MTG AG*
Dr. Falko Strenzke

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