Hi Gyan, Thanks for the review. No new IKEv2 code points are needed. The draft reuses the generic Digital Signature method (RFC 7427), which identifies the algorithm by OID in the AUTH payload, so new PQC algorithms need no IKEv2 registry change. Rekeying is unaffected by the PQC signature algorithms, CREATE_CHILD_SA carries no AUTH payload.
Cheers, -Tiru On Mon, 20 Jul 2026 at 02:40, Gyan Mishra via Datatracker <[email protected]> wrote: > Document: draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-pqc-auth > Title: Signature Authentication in the Internet Key Exchange Version 2 > (IKEv2) > using PQC Reviewer: Gyan Mishra Review result: Almost Ready > > I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area > Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed > by the IESG for the IETF Chair. Please treat these comments just > like any other last call comments. > > For more information, please see the FAQ at > > <https://wiki.ietf.org/en/group/gen/GenArtFAQ>. > > Document: draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-pqc-auth-?? > Reviewer: Gyan Mishra > Review Date: 2026-07-19 > IETF LC End Date: 2026-07-31 > IESG Telechat date: Not scheduled for a telechat > > Summary: > > Signature-based authentication methods are utilized in the Internet Key > Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2). The current version of the IKEv2 protocol, > specified in RFC 7296, supports traditional digital signatures. > > This document specifies a generic mechanism for integrating post-quantum > cryptographic (PQC) digital signature algorithms into the IKEv2 protocol. > The > approach allows for seamless inclusion of any PQC signature scheme within > the > existing authentication framework of IKEv2. Additionally, it outlines how > Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signatures (ML-DSA) and Stateless Hash-Based > Digital Signatures (SLH-DSA), can be employed as authentication methods > within > the IKEv2 protocol, as they have been standardized by US NIST. > > I believe this specification is almost ready for publication. > > One question I would like to ask the authors is related to any IANA code > points > for the use of PQC for signature for IKEv2. > > As this is standards track and a significant change to IKEv2 which does > impact > all IPSEC implementations vendors supporting the PQM update feature. > > To ensure standardization and forward and backward compatibility in the > implementation should there be a standard codepoint allocated for the > drafts > update to IKEv2 for PQM signature signing. > > What is the impact on SA security association rekeying during key update > intervals. I do not see anything mentioned related but as we are using a > new > PQM signing mechanism, I wonder if there is any impact and if so it should > be > added to the considerations section. > > Major issues: > None > > Minor issues: > None > > Nits/editorial comments: > None > > >
_______________________________________________ IPsec mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
