Hi all,

The 2nd issue is about key management.  Steve Bellovin also raised
this point with the draft.

Russ says:

  In section 8.4, one of my previous comments was rejected without
  explanation.  I said:  "I am uncomfortable with support for IKE being
  a MAY.  It ought to be a SHOULD."  While I understand that an 
  Informational document is an inappropriate vehicle to impose this
  requirement, the deployment benefits can be pointed out.
  
My proposed text is:

8.4 Key Management Methods

        An implementation MUST support the manual configuration of the security key 
and 
        SPI.  The SPI configuration is needed in orderto delineate between multiple 
keys.

        Key management SHOULD be supported.  Examples of key management systems 
        include IKEv1 [RFC-2407] [RFC-2408] [RFC-2409], IKEv2 [IKEv2] and Kerberos; 
        S/MIME and TLS include key management functions.

        Where key refresh, anti-replay features of AH and ESP, or on-demand creation 
        of Security Associations (SAs) is required, automated keying MUST be 
supported. 

        Key management methods for multicast traffic are also being worked on by the 
        MSEC WG.

I still need to get an OK from Russ, if the text is accurate & meets his concerns.
However, I need to get input from the WG if this is OK as well.

thanks,
John

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