Sep 18th 2008
>From The Economist print edition

America will not win the war in Afghanistan by taking it across the
border into Pakistan's tribal areas

Reuters

ALLIED gloom about the war in Afghanistan tends to be seasonal. The
hopes of spring are dented by a summer of roadside explosions,
suicide-bombings and ambushes. But this autumn they have nearly been
dashed altogether. Violence is at its highest level since the
toppling of the Taliban in 2001. The chairman of America's joint
chiefs of staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, has admitted he is "not
convinced we're winning it" in Afghanistan. On the ground the mood is
bleaker. Foreign aid-workers in Kabul feel under siege. Generals
grumble about needing thousands more soldiers. Some diplomats seem
close to despair. For those hoping Afghanistan can soon achieve peace
and stability, these are desperate times.

One desperate measure adopted by America in response has been to
attack the presumed bases in Pakistan's tribal areas from which
militants mount cross-border operations. Since Pakistan is failing to
live up to its promise to deny the insurgents sanctuary, exasperated
American generals have decided to act themselves. But launching
attacks in Pakistan in defiance of its government is
counterproductive.

On September 3rd American commandos mounted an attack in South
Waziristan, part of Pakistan's semi-autonomous Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA). Pakistanis say another incursion this week was
repulsed, though both armies deny it. Certainly, American forces have
been stepping up strikes. There have been a dozen in a fortnight.

Anti-American sentiment in Pakistan is easily provoked, and it is
hard to imagine greater provocation. The government, which says the
American attacks have cost civilian lives, has been fiercely critical
of them. Worse, there are suspicions in Pakistan that their timing
was influenced by the political calendar in Washington. The Bush
administration, it is thought, is impatient for an "October surprise"
in the form of the killing or capture of al-Qaeda bigwigs hiding in
the FATA.

Even if these suspicions are groundless, unilateral cross-border
attacks, which appear to have killed no "high-value targets", are a
bad idea. In Afghanistan itself the Taliban have been adept at duping
foreign forces into becoming their recruiters through the killing of
civilians. In the FATA there is the same risk: that the raids end up
making the local population—and the rest of Pakistan—even more
hostile to America. They certainly undermine the fragile new civilian
government of President Asif Zardari. To be treated with such
contempt by an ally weakens Mr Zardari's standing at home, and makes
Pakistan's army—never tolerant of civilian direction—even less likely
to heed the government.

Federally administer the tribal areas

Yet it is true that Afghanistan will never know peace while the
tribal areas provide a haven for insurgents. Force will be part of
the solution. But, as Mr Zardari knows, there also needs to be a
comprehensive plan to develop the region—building roads and providing
buses, schools and hospitals, but also dismantling the terrorist
infrastructure and, eventually, integrating the FATA fully into
Pakistan proper. America's cross-border pressure may have been
intended in part to impress upon Pakistan's leaders the urgency of
the military aspect.

If so, it has probably worked, and the Americans may now ease off.
Indeed, Admiral Mullen, visiting Islamabad on September 17th,
promised to respect Pakistani sovereignty. But Pakistan's foreign
minister complained that an American drone attack in North Waziristan
that day had again been undertaken without consultation. Pakistanis
will still need persuading that the fight against extremists is their
war, as well as America's. Admiral Mullen's soothing words were but a
start.

Source : http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?
story_id=12262189


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