http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/04/thoughts-on-usg-candor-to-china-on-cyber/
By Jack Goldsmith
lawfareblog.com
April 8, 2014
Paul is skeptical about the USG’s unilateral briefing to Chinese officials
on some of its cyber operations and doctrines that David Sanger discloses
in the NYT. He argues that China is unlikely to reciprocate, he doubts
the usefulness of the unilateral disclosure, and he wonders why the USG
does not share the information with the American public. I think the
matter is more complex.
First, it may be (as I have long argued) that greater candor by the USG
vis a vis China is a necessary precondition to genuine progress on the
development of norms for cyberoperations – both exploitation and attack.
Unless we can credibly convey what we are doing and what we might do (and
not do) in certain cyber situations, our adversaries will assume the worst
and (a) invest in their own cyber programs to keep up – a classic arms
race situation, and/or (b) interpret particular cyberoperations in a
risk-averse fashion, in their least charitable light, which might induce
unwarranted escalation in those contexts. Our adversaries will rationally
assume the worst because, despite USG claims about its responsible use of
cyber exploitations and attacks, the news is filled with reports about
prodigious USG cyber-operations and aggressive plans in this realm.
Indeed, as Sanger notes: “The Pentagon plans to spend $26 billion on
cybertechnology over the next five years — much of it for defense of the
military’s networks, but billions for developing offensive weapons — and
that sum does not include budgets for the intelligence community’s efforts
in more covert operations. It is one of the few areas, along with drones
and Special Operations forces, that are getting more investment at a time
of overall Pentagon cutbacks.”
Second, Paul is right to be skeptical about reciprocity by China. But it
sounds like the United States didn’t give up much new information on U.S.
doctrine for the use of cyberweapons. (Sanger states that “elements of
the doctrine can be pieced together from statements by senior officials
and a dense “Presidential Decision Directive” on such activities signed by
Mr. Obama in 2012.”) More importantly, the United States can in theory
benefit from unilateral disclosure of doctrine and weapons capabilities
even if China doesn’t reciprocate, for the unilateral disclosure might
assist China in interpreting, and not misinterpreting, USG actions in the
cyber realm – all to the USG’s advantage. As Sanger says, “American
officials say their latest initiatives were inspired by Cold-War-era
exchanges held with the Soviets so that each side understood the “red
lines” for employing nuclear weapons against each other.” In theory,
unilateral information disclosure to China about the nature of USG
cyberoperations can help China interpret USG actions properly, and can
thereby help tamp down on the possibility of mistaken escalation by China;
and the USG might also in this manner help China to see the benefits to
itself in disclosure to the USG.
[...]
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