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>>>I had asked for some technical details (tcpdump logs, etc...)
>>>of an attack that was detected, but none could be provided.
>>>I have put it through some testing and have found that it
>>>>most definitely is vulnerable to these techniques.
To summarize:
This guy admits he doesn't know what RealSecure is supposed to detect in the
first place (hence the request for tcpdump logs).
But he concludes that because it didn't detect something he threw in front
of it, that it must be vulnerable.
Not the most scientific testing I've ever seen. It doesn't make sense to
run a random new mutant attack in front of a sensor, and conclude simply
because it didn't report anything that it was fooled. You have to consider
what it is DESIGNED TO REPORT.
RealSecure is not DESIGNED to detect attacks by recognizing the shell code.
RealSecure detects buffer overflows by detecting the length of the long text
which OVERFLOWS THE BUFFER. This INCLUDES protocols like HTTP, RPC and DNS.
It does have one signature called GENERIC_BUFFER_OVERFLOW that looks for
common sequences of code in many shellcode sequences, this is used in
conjunction with the actual buffer overflow signatures to give the operator
some additional data for analysis.
I can only conclude that if he ran an ADMutate attack using HTTP or DNS or
RPC in front of RealSecure, that he probably ran some new exploit that we
haven't released an XPU for.
=====================================
Tim Farley
Senior Researcher
Internet Security Systems
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
(404) 236-2600
http://www.iss.net
Internet Security Systems - The Power to Protect
=====================================
-----Original Message-----
From: Steve [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Tuesday, April 10, 2001 9:22 AM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: FW: ADMmutate IDS Evasion Tool
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Here we go. This was posted by K2, the author of the tool.
Clarification on some actual tests on RealSecure 5. I also plan on doing
some tests myself.
-Steve
-----Original Message-----
From: Focus on Intrusion Detection Systems
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of K2
Sent: Monday, April 09, 2001 6:06 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: ADMmutate IDS Evasion Tool
Hi,
Just to straighten some things out. I have tested ISS RealSecure 5,
fully updated, it can detect suspicious packets with respect to
protocols that it understands (FTP/POP/IMAP) as overly long commands
(eg. USER AAAA[1024]). However for many other protocols that this
luxury is not present (HTTP/RPC/DNS), RealSecure can definitely NOT
detect polymorphic shellcode. I have put it through some testing and
have found that it most definitely is vulnerable to these techniques.
This feature of detecting suspicious packets is also implemented in
Dragon off the shelf, and I believe on the road map for snort. However,
for protocols where a simple length calculation cannot be used to
determine the hostile intent of some data, detection is not currently
possible.
I had asked for some technical details (tcpdump logs, etc...) of an
attack that was detected, but none could be provided. Polymorphic
shellcode is designed to attack NIDS, not H(ost)IDS or other form of
sensor.
Thanks,
K2
Dragos Ruiu wrote:
>
> On Wed, 04 Apr 2001, Rouland, Chris (ISSAtlanta) wrote:
> > ISS RealSecure has been confirmed as not vulnerable to the ADMmutate
> > evasive technique.
>
> So what does this actually mean?
>
> As I see it you are either saying....
>
> a) we have no shellcode signatures
>
> or
>
> b) we have fed all the existing exploits through ADMutate repeatedly
> and have identified other protocol traits to use for each signature
> independent of the shellcode for hundreds of exploits.
>
> I'm skeptical if you've had time to do the latter given the tool was
announced
> last Thursday, so I'll assume you mean the former. :-)
>
> Marketing proclamations in technical forums can be dangerous I think.
> I'm not picking on ISS even though they "opted out" of my IDS comparison
> here BTW, but the above proclamation seemed particularly vaporous and
premature,
> especially since the applications of K2's work are only now being
explored.
>
> As many know I'm usually on the pro-IDS side, but some careful thought
> and analysis needs to go into bold statements like the above. It does the
> entire industry a dis-service to try to spin control new developments like
this
> if they turn out to be new difficult problems, which I think the jury is
still
> out on as far as ADMutate goes.... (I'm sure as **** not fully sure how
much of
> a threat/IDS-problem this is yet, personally....)
>
> cheers,
> --dr
>
> --
> Dragos Ruiu <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> dursec.com ltd. / kyx.net - we're from the
future
> gpg/pgp key on file at wwwkeys.pgp.net or at http://dursec.com/drkey.asc
--
K2