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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ISS X-Force Security Brief November 28, 2001 CBlade SQL Worm The CBlade SQL Worm was designed propagate by exploiting a common misconfiguration in the Microsoft SQL Server Database. The worm then installs a DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) component that uses the IRC (Internet Relay Chat) network to communicate with the worm's author(s). The threat from this specific worm has now passed and its propagation has ceased. However, a new variant of this worm could be developed to exploit the same or a similar vulnerability in Microsoft SQL Server. The CBlade worm includes two main components: - - MS-SQL server scanning and infection - - IRC component for remote control of infected systems as DDoS zombies IRC component The worm generates a random nick for itself, and then connects to an IRC server and joins the #blitzed channel. These settings are hard-coded into the worm executable and encrypted with a trivial transpositional cipher scheme. From the IRC channel, the worm's author(s) or individuals familiar with the worm and the DDoS network could use the DDoS zombies to launch flooding attacks. MS-SQL scanning and infection The propagation method used by the worm involves scanning for and attempting to login to Microsoft SQL Servers. The worm scans the Internet for potential victims, and attempts to brute force connections to the "master" database with the "sa" account (the most privileged account on a Microsoft SQL Server). Any Microsoft SQL installation may be vulnerable if it is installed with a missing or weak "sa" account password. Once a target has been discovered, the worm uses the MS-SQL stored procedure "xp_cmdshell" to execute arbitrary commands. The CBlade worm uses the procedure to initiate a FTP connection to an external host to download and run the worm executable. The worm also makes various changes to the infected system's registry, and copies a .DLL on the system, as part of the Microsoft SQL Server compromise. The worm creates an entry named "DSQUERY" containing the value "DBNETLIB" in the following registry key: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\MSSQLServer\Client\ConnectTo This setting will nominate a "DBNETLIB.DLL" for data source querying. It also creates an entry named "ProtocolOrder" containing the value "tcp" in the following registry key: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\MSSQLServer\Client\SuperSocketNetLib This instructs the MS-SQL server client libraries to choose the TCP transport (among other possible transports such as Named Pipes) as the transport when attempting TTS connections to MS-SQL server data sources. Then the worm locates the MS-SQL client DLL, DBMSSOCN.DLL. This DLL is used for data source querying, and copies it to DBNETLIB.DLL (which the worm previously nominated). Removal Instructions: The worm infects the victim computer by adding itself to the system's registry, so that the worm will be executed when the system is rebooted. It creates a key under the name "TaskReg", in the following location in the registry: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run The value of this entry is the path of the worm executable, where the filename of the worm executable is typically "DNSSERVICE.EXE". To remove the worm: 1. Locate the path and the name of the worm executable from the registry. 2. Terminate the worm process. 3. Delete the registry entry. 4. Locate the worm executable, and delete it from the file system. Additional Information: The worm uses the RegisterServiceProcess Win32 API function present only in Windows 95/98 to hide itself from the Windows 95/98 task list (accessed by pressing CTRL+ALT+DEL). This also ensures that the worm does not terminate when a user logs off of the system. [RegisterServiceProcess (pid, RSP_SIMPLE_SERVICE);] The RegisterServiceProcess function was implemented in Windows 95/98 to let any background process notify Windows 95/98 that the process is a background process, which should be running for all user sessions, and as such, should not be terminated when a user logs off. A "feature" of this API call is that it hides such a process from the user task list. ISS X-Force Database, http://xforce.iss.net/static/7610.php Recommendations: Set the "sa" account password by using the "sp_password" procedure. Refer to the following X-Force Database entry for more information: http://xforce.iss.net/static/1459.php. Internet Scanner: Internet Scanner has support to check for installed SQL databases. The "SQL Server" check will allow Internet Scanner customers to better detect and audit SQL databases for security weaknesses such as the blank "sa" password. Database Scanner: Database Scanner includes the "No sa Password" check to find SQL databases that have 'sa' accounts with blank passwords. Run this check to locate vulnerable database servers. BlackICE products: The BlackICE line of products detects access attempts to Microsoft SQL databases by triggering the "SQL Port Probe", and the "SQL login failed" event. ISS has the following services for preventing worms or assisting you in case of a worm infection: - - Penetration Testing for pro-actively identifying potential worm-infection areas. - - Emergency Response Services for providing an incident response plan for containing and eliminating the worm. - - Remotely Managed AntiVirus Gateway where ISS automatically updates and protects against viruses and worms at the gateway. - - Remotely Managed IDS where ISS can monitor and respond to worm attacks. - - Remotely Managed Scanner where ISS can pro-actively identify vulnerabilities that would allow a worm into the network and provide best practice guides for addressing these weaknesses. ______ About Internet Security Systems (ISS) Internet Security Systems is a leading global provider of security management solutions for the Internet, protecting digital assets and ensuring safe and uninterrupted e-business. With its industry-leading intrusion detection and vulnerability assessment, remote managed security services, and strategic consulting and education offerings, ISS is a trusted security provider to more than 8,000 customers worldwide including 21 of the 25 largest U.S. commercial banks and the top 10 U.S. telecommunications companies. Founded in 1994, ISS is headquartered in Atlanta, GA, with additional offices throughout North America and international operations in Asia, Australia, Europe, Latin America and the Middle East. For more information, visit the Internet Security Systems web site at www.iss.net or call 888-901-7477. Copyright (c) 2001 Internet Security Systems, Inc. All rights reserved worldwide. Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this Alert electronically. It is not to be edited in any way without express consent of the X-Force. If you wish to reprint the whole or any part of this Alert in any other medium excluding electronic medium, please e-mail [EMAIL PROTECTED] for permission. Disclaimer The information within this paper may change without notice. Use of this information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are NO warranties with regard to this information. In no event shall the author be liable for any damages whatsoever arising out of or in connection with the use or spread of this information. Any use of this information is at the user's own risk. X-Force PGP Key available at: http://xforce.iss.net/sensitive.php as well as on MIT's PGP key server and PGP.com's key server. Please send suggestions, updates, and comments to: X-Force [EMAIL PROTECTED] of Internet Security Systems, Inc. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3a Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBPAWobTRfJiV99eG9AQEUCQP8D17e9CewCrQN9N1+GRn6Nxk3qZEEzvAg xhu7NkAiiQuPX1HIjgBA19mZILwt2ym+cwHytGceXKP5LZa5Y024vRy2sSturRUG WlyOJ5PCEM8eFTXPEOBROBZwn9OawFYQlJOTJLMhkHr/IMhPqTwJlqnLXzGgwztD f9GkZRnTj+U= =C4GC -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
