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Stevie Beck commented on COLLECTIONS-580: ----------------------------------------- This reminds me of the the general "SerialDoS" code, published here: https://gist.github.com/coekie/a27cc406fc9f3dc7a70d I am not THAT Java expert, so I just assume, that any application that allows deserialization from untrusted input, can be DoS'ed - regardless what libraries are included in the classpath. Just creation of code execution needs more investigation and creativity and the need to find suitable gadgets... > Arbitrary remote code execution with InvokerTransformer > ------------------------------------------------------- > > Key: COLLECTIONS-580 > URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/COLLECTIONS-580 > Project: Commons Collections > Issue Type: Bug > Affects Versions: 3.0, 4.0 > Reporter: Philippe Marschall > Fix For: 3.2.2, 4.1 > > Attachments: COLLECTIONS-580.patch > > > With {{InvokerTransformer}} serializable collections can be build that > execute arbitrary Java code. > {{sun.reflect.annotation.AnnotationInvocationHandler#readObject}} invokes > {{#entrySet}} and {{#get}} on a deserialized collection. If you have an > endpoint that accepts serialized Java objects (JMX, RMI, remote EJB, ...) you > can combine the two to create arbitrary remote code execution vulnerability. > I don't know of a good fix short of removing {{InvokerTransformer}} or making > it not Serializable. Both probably break existing applications. > This is not my research, but has been discovered by other people. > https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial > http://foxglovesecurity.com/2015/11/06/what-do-weblogic-websphere-jboss-jenkins-opennms-and-your-application-have-in-common-this-vulnerability/ -- This message was sent by Atlassian JIRA (v6.3.4#6332)