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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DRILL-5582?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel
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Rob Wu updated DRILL-5582:
--------------------------
    Description: 
Consider the scenario:
Alice has a drillbit (my.drillbit.co) with plain and kerberos authentication 
enabled containing important data. Bob, the attacker, attempts to spoof the 
connection and redirect it to his own drillbit (fake.drillbit.co) with no 
authentication setup. 

When Alice is under attack and attempts to connect to her secure drillbit, she 
is actually authenticating against Bob's drillbit. At this point, the 
connection should have failed due to unmatched configuration. However, the 
current implementation will return SUCCESS as long as the (spoofing) drillbit 
has no authentication requirement set.

Currently, the drillbit <-  to  -> drill client connection accepts the lowest 
authentication configuration set on the server. This leaves unsuspecting user 
vulnerable to spoofing. 

  was:
Consider the scenario:
Alice has a drillbit (my.drillbit.co) with plain and kerberos authentication 
enabled containing important data. Bob, the attacker, attempts to spoof the 
connection and redirect it to his own drillbit (fake.drillbit.co) with no 
authentication setup. 

When Alice is under attack and attempts to connect to her secure drillbit, she 
is actually authenticating against Bob's drillbit. At this point, the 
connection should have failed due to unmatched configuration. However, the 
current implementation will return SUCCESS as long as the (spoofing) drillbit 
has no authentication requirement set.

Currently, the drillbit <-  to  -> drill client connection accepts the lowest 
authentication configuration set on the server. This leaves the user vulnerable 
to spoofing. 


> [Threat Modeling] Drillbit may be spoofed by an attacker and this may lead to 
> data being written to the attacker's target instead of Drillbit
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: DRILL-5582
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DRILL-5582
>             Project: Apache Drill
>          Issue Type: Bug
>    Affects Versions: 1.10.0
>            Reporter: Rob Wu
>            Priority: Minor
>
> Consider the scenario:
> Alice has a drillbit (my.drillbit.co) with plain and kerberos authentication 
> enabled containing important data. Bob, the attacker, attempts to spoof the 
> connection and redirect it to his own drillbit (fake.drillbit.co) with no 
> authentication setup. 
> When Alice is under attack and attempts to connect to her secure drillbit, 
> she is actually authenticating against Bob's drillbit. At this point, the 
> connection should have failed due to unmatched configuration. However, the 
> current implementation will return SUCCESS as long as the (spoofing) drillbit 
> has no authentication requirement set.
> Currently, the drillbit <-  to  -> drill client connection accepts the lowest 
> authentication configuration set on the server. This leaves unsuspecting user 
> vulnerable to spoofing. 



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