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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HBASE-9578?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=13786196#comment-13786196
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Larry McCay commented on HBASE-9578:
------------------------------------

Just a high level follow up question here: I certainly understand the premise 
here but I sort of feel like client machines are probably more easily 
compromised than server - no?

Especially, REST client machines/phones/tablets, etc.

Perhaps, this is a reason for REST to be treated differently and this 
protection put into a gateway like stargate or Knox (though that would only 
protect it through that channel)?

> Client side cell encryption
> ---------------------------
>
>                 Key: HBASE-9578
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/HBASE-9578
>             Project: HBase
>          Issue Type: New Feature
>            Reporter: Andrew Purtell
>
> HBASE-7544 will protect key and value data on the server from accidental 
> leakage by way of improperly disposed disks, improper direct filesystem 
> access, or incorrect HDFS permissions. There are also use cases where 
> sensitive data stored in a table or column family by a given user or 
> application should be protected from all others, and the combination of 
> transparent server-side storage encryption and transport security (SASL 
> auth-conf) is still not sufficient. These instances call for a client side 
> per-cell encryption feature, given the following additional observations:
> - The scope of transmission, distribution, and storage of private key 
> material should be as limited as possible. The server is a centralized target 
> (even in the case of an HBase cluster) where the scope of damage from a 
> compromise is magnified if user key material also resides there or can be 
> intercepted after compromise. Where keys are stored in hardware devices, e.g. 
> smartcards, getting the keys to the server may be not possible anyway.
> - A client system is far more likely than a contended shared server resource 
> to have necessary available CPU cycles for per-operation cryptographic 
> overheads.
> For some cases we might not care so much about the second item, but the first 
> is very important.
> I have an implementation of per cell client side encryption as an encrypting 
> HTable wrapper which I could contribute if there is interest.
> This JIRA is also about brainstorming how to do better than that.



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