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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/IGNITE-15322?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel
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Mikhail Petrov updated IGNITE-15322:
------------------------------------
Description:
For example, this code needs TASK_EXECUTE permissions.
{code:java}
Affinity affinity = ignite.affinity("TEST");
affinity.mapKeysToNodes(Arrays.asList(1L,100L, 1000L));{code}
This is unexpected behavior, because:
- the task started implicitly (under the hood), customer should not to know
about it.
- this is a system task (not defined by a customer), the tasks needs for a
normal grid workflow.
Also, I suppose there are any other implicitly tasks, which could lead to
unexpected behavior (need permissions).
Possible way to solve this issue:
1. Add mechanism to destinguish whether task class is SYSTEM (part of the
Ignite codebase) or USER.
Here we can reuse SecurityUtils#isSystemType mechanism that is used in Ignite
Sanbox implementation.
2. Add mechanism to detect if task execution was initiated by the user (PUBLIC
CALL) or by the Ignite system itself (INTERNAL CALL).
It seems that the easiest way to achieve this is to completely separate the
public and private Compute APIs.
Task executioin requests received through Ignite Thin Clients are considered
PUBLIC CALLs.
For Ignite node API we can provide dedicated methods to obtain internal version
of compute instances in IgniteEx and force developers to use them for any
internal means.
{code:java}
public interface IgniteEx extends Ignite {
/** */
public IgniteComputeImpl internalCompute();
/** */
public IgniteComputeImpl internalCompute(ClusterGroup grp);
}
{code}
The first two steps give us the ability to
A. safely skip authorization of SYSTEM tasks which are
called through INTERNAL API unless permissions are specified explicitly (see
clause 3).
B. keep authorization of PUBLIC tasks intact
C. prevent users of calling SYSTEM tasks directly through PUBLIC API ( it means
that all user task execution requests received through REST or Thin client
protocols MUST be executed through PUBLIC API).
3. Add the ability to explicitly specify for SYSTEM
task/callable/runnable/closure what permission should be checked before its
execution. This helps to skip sending task execution requests between nodes if
the user does not have permission to execute the task.
It can be solved by introducing optionsl interface that any task executable can
implement.
{code:java}
/** */
public interface SecurityPermissionAware {
/** */
public SecurityPermissionSet requiredPermissions();
}
{code}
1. Mentioned SecurityUtils#isSystemType works only for the ignite-core module.
If some tasks are defined inside other Ignite modules - they will not be
considered SYSTEM. Currently there are no such task.
2. Currently all DotNet tasks execution is authorized by the name of the SYSTEM
wrapper task. We should decide how to properly fix their authorization.
was:
For example, this code needs TASK_EXECUTE permissions.
{code:java}
Affinity affinity = ignite.affinity("TEST");
affinity.mapKeysToNodes(Arrays.asList(1L,100L, 1000L));{code}
This is unexpected behavior, because:
- the task started implicitly (under the hood), customer should not to know
about it.
- this is a system task (not defined by a customer), the tasks needs for a
normal grid workflow.
Also, I suppose there are any other implicitly tasks, which could lead to
unexpected behavior (need permissions).
Possible way to solve this issue:
1. Add mechanism to destinguish whether task class is SYSTEM (part of the
Ignite codebase) or USER. Here we can reuse SecurityUtils#isSystemType.
2. Add mechanism to detect if task execution was initiated by the user (PUBLIC
CALL) or by the Ignite system itself (INTERNAL CALL).
3. Add ability to explicitly specify for SYSTEM task/callable/runnable/closure
what permission should be checked before its execution.
4. Skip permission check for the tasks that are SYSTEM and initiated by the
Ignite internal code unless permissions are specified explicitly.
5. Restrict execution of SYSTEM tasks initiated by the user directly and for
which no explicit permissions are specified.
Possible troubles:
1. We have control.sh tasks that are executed via the thin client. Task
execution through the thin client compute is considered as PUBLIC CALL so we
should assign some permission to each control.sh task.
To skip creation of a separate permissions for each control.sh task it is
proposed to group tasks that belongs to the same control.sh command e.g.
control.sh --cache ... tasks will require ADMIN_CACHE permission
control.sh --tx ... tasks will require ADMIN_TX permission
2. Mentioned SecurityUtils#isSystemType works only for the ignite-core module.
If some tasks are defined inside other Ignite modules - they will not be
considered SYSTEM. Currently there are no such task.
> System tasks should run without any explicitly granted permissions
> ------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: IGNITE-15322
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/IGNITE-15322
> Project: Ignite
> Issue Type: Bug
> Components: compute, security
> Reporter: Ilya Kazakov
> Assignee: Mikhail Petrov
> Priority: Minor
> Labels: ise
> Time Spent: 10m
> Remaining Estimate: 0h
>
> For example, this code needs TASK_EXECUTE permissions.
> {code:java}
> Affinity affinity = ignite.affinity("TEST");
> affinity.mapKeysToNodes(Arrays.asList(1L,100L, 1000L));{code}
> This is unexpected behavior, because:
> - the task started implicitly (under the hood), customer should not to know
> about it.
> - this is a system task (not defined by a customer), the tasks needs for a
> normal grid workflow.
> Also, I suppose there are any other implicitly tasks, which could lead to
> unexpected behavior (need permissions).
> Possible way to solve this issue:
> 1. Add mechanism to destinguish whether task class is SYSTEM (part of the
> Ignite codebase) or USER.
> Here we can reuse SecurityUtils#isSystemType mechanism that is used in
> Ignite Sanbox implementation.
> 2. Add mechanism to detect if task execution was initiated by the user
> (PUBLIC CALL) or by the Ignite system itself (INTERNAL CALL).
> It seems that the easiest way to achieve this is to completely separate the
> public and private Compute APIs.
> Task executioin requests received through Ignite Thin Clients are considered
> PUBLIC CALLs.
> For Ignite node API we can provide dedicated methods to obtain internal
> version of compute instances in IgniteEx and force developers to use them for
> any internal means.
> {code:java}
> public interface IgniteEx extends Ignite {
> /** */
> public IgniteComputeImpl internalCompute();
> /** */
> public IgniteComputeImpl internalCompute(ClusterGroup grp);
> }
> {code}
> The first two steps give us the ability to
> A. safely skip authorization of SYSTEM tasks which are
> called through INTERNAL API unless permissions are specified explicitly (see
> clause 3).
> B. keep authorization of PUBLIC tasks intact
> C. prevent users of calling SYSTEM tasks directly through PUBLIC API ( it
> means that all user task execution requests received through REST or Thin
> client protocols MUST be executed through PUBLIC API).
> 3. Add the ability to explicitly specify for SYSTEM
> task/callable/runnable/closure what permission should be checked before its
> execution. This helps to skip sending task execution requests between nodes
> if the user does not have permission to execute the task.
> It can be solved by introducing optionsl interface that any task executable
> can implement.
> {code:java}
> /** */
> public interface SecurityPermissionAware {
> /** */
> public SecurityPermissionSet requiredPermissions();
> }
> {code}
> 1. Mentioned SecurityUtils#isSystemType works only for the ignite-core
> module. If some tasks are defined inside other Ignite modules - they will not
> be considered SYSTEM. Currently there are no such task.
> 2. Currently all DotNet tasks execution is authorized by the name of the
> SYSTEM wrapper task. We should decide how to properly fix their authorization.
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