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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/KARAF-5330?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=16154897#comment-16154897
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Tom Quarendon commented on KARAF-5330:
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But that not really the same thing is it?
I don't know enough about the capabilities of the shell to know whether that
closes all the holes. For example, > isn't covered by access control, so maybe
there are other things too. I bet it's possible to find ways of generating
stuff that I can then pipe to a file with '>'.
In order to use that technique, I would have to remove all the supplied access
control lists from the etc directory and then set that property. So fine, now
only admins can execute any command at all. But as soon as I want to allow
another type of user to be able to execute a command, I reopen the hole. So
kind of what is the point of the whole role based access control on commands. I
can't use and maintain a secure system.
It troubles me that the default configuration isn't secure. I bet that someone
who knows what they are doing could at best mess up any karaf installation they
have access to, regardless of their level of authorisation.
> Default access control list for console allows any user to cat files, and
> write to files.
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: KARAF-5330
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/KARAF-5330
> Project: Karaf
> Issue Type: Bug
> Components: karaf-security, karaf-shell
> Reporter: Tom Quarendon
> Assignee: Jean-Baptiste Onofré
> Fix For: 4.2.0, 4.0.10, 4.1.3
>
>
> The shell:cat command has no access control list associated with it in the
> default configuration.
> The same is true of the "shell:ls" command. There may be other shell:
> commands too that can provide filesystem access. I don't know whether cd, pwd
> for example should be secured. "tac" most certainly should.
> This means that any user that can access the ssh console can navigate the
> filesystem, reading and writing files as they like.
> For example, given the default configuration, if I have a "normal" user and
> can therefore access the console, I can use shell commands to find our or
> guess the location of the karaf install (shell:pwd will do that), then cat
> the contents of the etc/users.properties file and find out all users
> passwords (in the default configuration the passwords are in plain text). I
> can also cat the etc/host.key file which would seem undesirable.
> tac clearly would be a very dangerous command to have access to. It seems
> likely that I could subvert many things by just writing directly to
> configuration files using tac. I could, for example, change, or at least
> invalidate the admin password by rewriting the users.properties file.
> All in all this feels like a major issue.
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