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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/MESOS-5388?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=15285218#comment-15285218
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Gilbert Song commented on MESOS-5388:
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[~jdef]thanks for reporting the issue.
To better understand, is this issue referring that any arbitrary commands may
be included in `container_path`? which make it dangerous since we will run a
shell command including that `contianer_path`.
First, we should do more on users, and we have MESOS-4936 to support container
capabilities.
Second, container_path should not be regarded as totally without sanitation (we
should do more though), because in docker volume isolator prepare() we will
`mkdir` for the container_path:
https://github.com/apache/mesos/blame/bd9d208972dbfae4e0d15b053b754de3e02a763e/src/slave/containerizer/mesos/isolators/docker/volume/isolator.cpp#L375~#L380
which will cause a failure in prepare() before we set CommandInof.commands, so
many dangerous commands attached with the container_path should be filtered out.
> MesosContainerizerLaunch flags execute arbitrary commands via shell
> -------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: MESOS-5388
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/MESOS-5388
> Project: Mesos
> Issue Type: Bug
> Reporter: James DeFelice
> Labels: mesosphere, security
>
> For example, the docker volume isolator's containerPath is appended (without
> sanitation) to a command that's executed in this manner. As such, it's
> possible to inject arbitrary shell commands to be executed by mesos.
> https://github.com/apache/mesos/blob/17260204c833c643adf3d8f36ad8a1a606ece809/src/slave/containerizer/mesos/launch.cpp#L206
> Perhaps instead of strings these commands could/should be sent as string
> arrays that could be passed as argv arguments w/o shell interpretation?
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